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ABSTRACT 
Cyber systems are ubiquitous in all aspects of society. At the same time, breaches to 
cyber systems continue to be front-page news (Calfas, 2018; Equifax, 2017) and, despite more 
than a decade of heightened focus on cybersecurity, the threat continues to evolve and grow, 
costing globally up to $575 billion annually (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
2014; Gosler & Von Thaer, 2013; Microsoft, 2016; Verizon, 2017). To address possible impacts 
due to cyber threats, information system (IS) stakeholders must assess the risks they face. 
Following a risk assessment, the next step is to determine mitigations to counter the threats that 
pose unacceptably high risks. The literature contains a robust collection of studies on optimizing 
mitigation selections, but they universally assume that the starting list of appropriate mitigations 
for specific threats exists from which to down-select. In current practice, producing this starting 
list is largely a manual process and it is challenging because it requires detailed cybersecurity 
knowledge from highly decentralized sources, is often deeply technical in nature, and is 
primarily described in textual form, leading to dependence on human experts to interpret the 
knowledge for each specific context. At the same time cybersecurity experts remain in short 
supply relative to the demand, while the delta between supply and demand continues to grow 
(Center for Cyber Safety and Education, 2017; Kauflin, 2017; Libicki, Senty, & Pollak, 2014). 
Thus, an approach is needed to help cybersecurity experts (CSE) cut through the volume of 
available mitigations to select those which are potentially viable to offset specific threats.  
This dissertation explores the application of machine learning and text retrieval 
techniques to automate matching of relevant mitigations to cyber threats, where both are 
expressed as unstructured or semi-structured English language text. Using the Design Science 
Research Methodology (Hevner & March, 2004; Peffers, Tuunanen, Rothenberger, & 
Chatterjee, 2007), we consider a number of possible designs for the matcher, ultimately 
selecting a supervised machine learning approach that combines two techniques: support vector 
machine classification and latent semantic analysis. The selected approach demonstrates high 
recall for mitigation documents in the relevant class, bolstering confidence that potentially 
viable mitigations will not be overlooked. It also has a strong ability to discern documents in 
the non-relevant class, allowing approximately 97% of non-relevant mitigations to be excluded 
automatically, greatly reducing the CSE’s workload over purely manual matching. A false 
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positive rate of up to 3% prevents totally automated mitigation selection and requires the CSE 
to reject a few false positives. 
This research contributes to theory a method for automatically mapping mitigations to 
threats when both are expressed as English language text documents. This artifact represents a 
novel machine learning approach to threat-mitigation mapping. The research also contributes 
an instantiation of the artifact for demonstration and evaluation. From a practical perspective 
the artifact benefits all threat-informed cyber risk assessment approaches, whether formal or ad 
hoc, by aiding decision-making for cybersecurity experts whose job it is to mitigate the 
identified cyber threats. In addition, an automated approach makes mitigation selection more 
repeatable, facilitates knowledge reuse, extends the reach of cybersecurity experts, and is 
extensible to accommodate the continued evolution of both cyber threats and mitigations. 
Moreover, the selection of mitigations applicable to each threat can serve as inputs into 
multifactor analyses of alternatives, both automated and manual, thereby bridging the gap 
between cyber risk assessment and final mitigation selection. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Cyber systems1 are ubiquitous in all aspects of society. At the same time, breaches to 
cyber systems continue to be front-page news (Calfas, 2018; Equifax, 2017) and, despite more 
than a decade of heightened focus on cybersecurity, the threat continues to evolve and grow, 
costing globally up to $575 billion annually (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
2014; Gosler & Von Thaer, 2013; Microsoft, 2016; Verizon, 2017). Symantec reported that 
“Cyber attackers revealed new levels of ambition in 2016, a year marked by extraordinary 
attacks, including multi-million-dollar virtual bank heists, overt attempts to disrupt the US 
electoral process by state-sponsored groups, and some of the biggest distributed denial of 
service (DDoS) attacks on record powered by a botnet of Internet of Things (IoT) devices” 
(Chandrasekar et al., 2017).  
Regrettably, subsequent years have not been less exciting on the cybersecurity front 
(Symantec, 2019; Verizon, 2017). The Cisco 2018 Annual Cybersecurity Report identifies a 
number of recent changes in the threat landscape which continue to impact growth of the 
mitigation landscape. For example, self-propagating malware has moved to the network where 
it can spread very rapidly. In addition, adversaries continue to improve their abilities to evade 
existing security measures. Also, supply chain threats are on the rise and mitigation strategies 
against them are immature. Moreover, the years 2017 and 2018 saw a dramatic rise in 
ransomware along with rapid adoption of cloud and Internet of Things technologies for which 
mitigation strategies remain in the early stages (Cisco Systems, 2018).  
To address possible impacts due to cyber threats, information system (IS) stakeholders 
must assess the risks they face. To that end, there is an extensive body of research and practice 
in the cyber risk assessment discipline. Many mature organizations employ formal risk 
                                                 
1
 Definitions of cyber terms are provided in Appendix A. In this paper, we use the term “mitigation” 
synonymously with “countermeasure” and “security control” to mean a tool or technique that may counter a 
cyber threat. 
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assessment methodologies in an attempt to achieve rigor, although ad hoc approaches are also 
used. We briefly discuss a selection of risk assessment methods in the Literature Review section 
below. These methods help stakeholders identify and prioritize cyber risks. After completing 
the risk assessment, in whatever form, stakeholders may have a better understanding of threats 
to their mission-critical IS assets. 
Following risk assessment, the next step is to determine mitigations to counter the 
threats that pose unacceptably high risk, but this is challenging for several reasons. First, cyber 
threats and the means to counter them continue to proliferate (Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 2014; Gosler & Von Thaer, 2013; Microsoft, 2016; Verizon, 2017). 
Consequently, the universe of documents describing cyber threats and potential mitigations is 
quite large and continually growing but there is currently no comprehensive source of threat-
mitigation mappings. For example, NIST 800-53 (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2017) is a well-known catalog of security control documents often referenced 
during the mitigation stage of cyber risk assessment. While it contains valuable knowledge, 
NIST 800-53 does not relate mitigations to specific threats, and thus, does not deter application 
of mitigations that over- or under-address the actual threats. On the other hand, the National 
Intelligence Cyber Threat Framework is a comprehensive threat framework, but it does not 
currently offer mitigation mappings (National Security Agency, 2018). The Common Attack 
Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) is another threat framework (MITRE, 2017a). 
While CAPEC does contain a few representative mappings of mitigations to threats, these have 
been manually generated by cybersecurity experts, they are not all-inclusive, and mitigation 
selection is not the primary intent of the CAPEC framework. Second, over-applying mitigations 
wastes resources while under-applying or incorrectly applying mitigations, leaves residual risk 
and can result in a false sense of security. Third, to propose sensible mitigations one must 
acquire detailed cybersecurity knowledge. In current practice, knowledge about mitigations and 
threats is primarily contained in documents. This knowledge resides in numerous, highly 
decentralized sources, which are often deeply technical in nature and are primarily described in 
textual form, resulting in dependence on human experts to interpret the knowledge for the 
specific context.  
To date, manual selection by cyber security experts continues to be the de facto method 
for identifying mitigations to cyber threats. Several issues arise from reliance solely on manual 
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selection by experts for cybersecurity mitigation decisions. First, cybersecurity experts continue 
to be in short supply relative to the demand, while the delta between supply and demand 
continues to grow (Center for Cyber Safety and Education, 2017; Kauflin, 2017; Libicki et al., 
2014). In addition, the time-consuming nature of manual matching necessarily limits the 
number of sources of possible mitigations that can be consulted during any cyber risk 
assessment. Moreover, human variation in expertise and in sources consulted can lead to uneven 
and non-repeatable application of the available knowledge (Bolger & Wright, 1994; Hallberg, 
Bengtsson, Hallberg, Karlzén, & Sommestad, 2017; Holm, Sommestad, Ekstedt, & Honeth, 
2014).  
Problem Statement and Research Gap 
 
Figure 1. Research Gap 
In this research, we set out to fill the research gap illustrated in Figure 1 by devising a 
method for matching mitigations to cyber threats expressed as English language text documents 
using machine learning and text retrieval techniques in support of cyber risk assessment. A 
fundamental goal of all cyber risk assessments, whether methodical or ad hoc, is to identify the 
threats faced in a particular environment with enough detail that specific, applicable mitigations 
can be determined, prioritized, and implemented. The first step in a cyber risk assessment is to 
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assess the cyber risk of the system by considering the threats against it. The output of this step 
is a list of high priority threats to be mitigated. The next step is to determine candidate 
mitigations to address the threats. As discussed above, this is difficult and has inherent issues 
of scalability, consistency, and repeatability because, absent automation to help match 
mitigations to threats, mitigation selection is primarily a manual process done by human experts 
using disparate textual sources. There are two dimensions to the mitigation selection problem. 
The first is a technical dimension, that is, for each threat, enumerating a set of possible 
mitigations that are capable of countering it. The second, optimizing mitigations, is an 
organizational dimension where budgetary and other organizational constraints necessitate 
winnowing the list of potentially applicable mitigations to those that are organizationally 
feasible. Our research focuses on the first dimension and is distinct from the second dimension.  
The literature contains abundant research on the second dimension, herein referred to as 
mitigation optimization but also sometimes called trade space or analysis of alternatives. We 
briefly discuss a selection of mitigation optimization methods in the Literature Review section 
below. These approaches universally assume that the applicable set of potential mitigations for 
input into the mitigation optimization analysis has already been determined; however, cyber 
risk assessment approaches stop short of providing this list of potential mitigations leaving 
a gap. This dissertation addresses the gap by developing an automated method for matching 
mitigations to threats to obtain the initial set of potentially relevant mitigations. It is distinct 
from the mitigation optimization problem which commences after the initial list is made and 
forms the reservoir from which downstream risk-informed mitigation and mitigation 
optimization analyses can draw.  
Objectives and Intended Contributions of the Project 
The objective of this research project is to investigate the application of machine 
learning and text retrieval techniques for matching mitigations to cyber threats where both are 
expressed as unstructured or semi-structured English language text.  We hypothesize that we 
can devise an automated or semi-automated method that has the potential to reduce workload 
for the CSE by recommending possible mitigations for a given threat when both are English 
language documents. We use Fedorowicz’s definition of “document” as “a chunk of 
information, usually dealing with a relatively limited topic or subject area.” (Fedorowicz, 1996)  
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Significant research exists both in threat-informed cyber risk assessment methodologies 
and mitigation optimization techniques. This research project addresses the gap between these 
two areas as described in the prior section. To that end, we investigate applicable text mining 
techniques from the machine learning and document-driven decision support systems (DSS) 
disciplines, assess to what degree these techniques apply to the domain of cyber threats and 
mitigations, look for domain-specific peculiarities, and recommend changes in how 
cybersecurity practitioners describe threats and mitigations to support the use of automated, 
document-matching schemes.  
The primary contribution of this research to theory is the artifact, a novel machine 
learning method for matching mitigations documents to threats. We also provide instantiations 
of the method for demonstration. From a practical perspective, an automated approach to 
matching mitigations to threats benefits all threat-informed cyber risk assessment approaches 
by aiding decision-making and reducing workload for cybersecurity experts whose job it is to 
mitigate the identified cyber threats. Moreover, an automated approach can support 
development and maintenance of a knowledge base to make mitigation selection more 
repeatable, facilitate knowledge reuse, and extend the reach of cybersecurity experts. The 
approach will be extensible to accommodate the continued evolution of both cyber threats and 
mitigations. The selection of mitigations applicable to each of the threats can serve as inputs 
into mitigation optimization approaches thereby bridging the gap between cyber risk 
assessment and final mitigation selection.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we discuss related 
literature in three domains: cyber risk assessment, mitigation optimization analysis, and 
document-driven decision supports systems. In Chapter 3, we discuss our research 
methodology, which is grounded in the principles of the Design Science Research Methodology 
(DSRM) (Hevner & March, 2004; Peffers et al., 2007), seeking tangible IS solutions to “wicked 
problems” (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2004). Per the DSRM, we identify objectives of a solution 
to our stated research problem, then we discuss the design and development of the solution 
artifact drawing from the knowledge base of applicable theory. We also discuss our approach 
to demonstrating the use of the artifact to solve a real-life problem and the evaluation criteria 
used to measure the success of the artifact. In Chapter 4, we discuss our results and assess the 
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validity of our research. Finally, in Chapter 5 we discuss conclusions and limitations of the 
present research and propose future work. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A solution to the problem of automatically selecting mitigations pertinent to a given 
threat lies at the nexus of threat-informed cyber risk assessment methodologies and mitigation 
optimization analysis. We investigate literature in these two domains to ensure that our solution 
broadly supports existing methodologies. We also survey existing threat taxonomies and 
control catalogs to further delineate the gap. Despite an extensive search of the literature, we 
did not find any published research dealing specifically with automated matching of mitigations 
to cyber threats; hence, the DSS section of this literature review considers research that we 
consider analogous to our research problem. 
Cyber Risk Assessment Methodologies 
A number of threat-informed cyber risk assessment methodologies are described in the 
literature and in use today. They include AURUM (Fenz, Ekelhart, & Neubauer, 2011),  BluGen 
(Llanso, McNeil, Pearson, & Moore, 2017), Crown Jewels Analysis and Threat Assessment 
and Remediation Analysis  (CJA+TARA) (MITRE, 2015), Mission Information Risk Analysis 
(MIRA) (Llanso, Hamilton, & Silberglitt, 2012; Llanso, Tally, Silberglitt, & Anderson, 2013), 
NIST SP 800-30 (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012), Operationally Critical 
Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) (Caralli, Stevens, Young, & Wilson, 
2007), and Risk IT (ISACA, 2009; Schmittling, 2010). These methods are representative of 
approaches in use by organizations that employ structured threat-informed cyber risk 
assessment and their descriptions are available in open literature. This is not an exhaustive 
survey, and in particular does not include proprietary and other closed-source methodologies. 
The approaches mentioned here, which are described in more detail in Appendix E, have several 
themes in common, including an enumeration of the critical IT assets and data, consideration 
of threats (e.g. in terms of vulnerabilities, adverse events, or adversary capabilities), expert 
scoring (e.g. estimated likelihood of event occurrence, level of adversary effort to cause the 
effect, consequence/mission event impact), and methods which combine the scores in order to 
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identify high priority threats. For purposes of the research gap we seek to fill, the key take-away 
about threat-informed cyber risk assessment is this: most existing cyber risk assessment 
methods stop short of recommending mitigations. 
Mitigation Optimization Analysis 
A number of authors have tackled the problem of mitigation optimization analysis; that 
is, taking a longer list of possible mitigations and prioritizing or down-selecting to a shorter list 
based on a set of defined objectives. These methods are summarized below and described in 
more detail in Appendix F.   
Multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM), also known as multiple-criteria decision 
analysis (MCDA), is widely applied to security portfolio2 selection (Barnard & von Solms, 
2000; Fenz et al., 2011; Patterson, Nutaro, Allgood, Kuruganti, & Fugate, 2013; Sawik, 2013; 
Schilling & Werners, 2016; Weishäupl, 2017; Yevseyeva, Basto-Fernandes, Emmerich, & Van 
Moorsel, 2015). MCDM is used to analyze problems where measures of costs and benefits exist 
and can be traded off to arrive at the best solution under the given constraints. Some MCDM 
techniques applied to mitigation optimization include or are based on fuzzy set theory (Otero, 
2014), multi-attribute utility theory (i.e. value functions, knapsack strategy) (Fielder, Panaousis, 
Malacaria, Hankin, & Smeraldi, 2016; Panaousis, Fielder, Malacaria, Hankin, & Smeraldi, 
2014; Shapasand, Shajari, Golpaygani, & Ghavamipoor, 2015; Smeraldi & Malacaria, 2014), 
evolutionary multi-objective optimization (EMO) also known as genetic algorithms (Gupta, 
Rees, Chaturvedi, & Chi, 2006; Kiesling, Ekelhart, Grill, Strauss, & Stummer, 2016; Kiesling, 
Strauß, & Stummer, 2012; Rees, Deane, Rakes, & Baker, 2011; Sarala, Zayaraz, & 
Vijayalakshmi, 2016; Viduto, Maple, Huang, & López-Peréz, 2012), analytic hierarchy process 
(AHP) (El-Gayar & Fritz, 2010), grey relational analysis (GRA) (Breier & Hudec, 2013), 
simple additive weighting (SAW) (Llanso, 2012; Llansó, McNeil, & Noteboom, 2019), the 
technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) (Breier & Hudec, 2013), 
and preference ranking organization method for enrichment evaluation (PROMETHEE) (Lv, 
Zhou, & Wang, 2011). In addition, several authors combine game theory with MCDM 
techniques for security portfolio selection (Fielder et al., 2016; Panaousis et al., 2014; Wang & 
                                                 
2
 An organization’s chosen list of mitigations is often referred to as a security portfolio. 
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Zhu, 2016). For purposes of the research gap we seek to fill the key take-away about mitigation 
optimization analyses is this: These approaches all assume that a starting set of possible 
mitigations exists on which to apply the prioritization/selection method; however, as we noted 
above, cyber risk assessment methods stop short of providing this data. A method to produce 
this initial mapping of potential mitigations to threats is the gap the current research seeks to 
fill. 
Threat Taxonomies and Control Catalogs 
A number of control catalogs exist in practice today, such as the Payment Card Industry 
Data Security Standards (PCI-DSS) (PCI Security Standards Council, 2015), HIPPA Security 
Standards (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2007), and NIST Security and Privacy 
Controls for Federal Systems (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012). These 
catalogs are intended to prescribe controls for compliance with security mandates, however, 
they do not map the controls to the specific threats they counter. Likewise, a number of threat 
frameworks exist in practice, including the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and 
Classification  (MITRE, 2017a), Carnegie-Mellon taxonomy of operational cyber security risks 
(Cebula, Popeck, & Young, 2014),  National Intelligence Cyber Threat Framework (National 
Security Agency, 2018), Open Threat Taxonomy (Enclave Security, 2015), and others 
(European Union Agency For Network And Information Security, 2016; Launius, 2018; 
Simmons, Shiva, Bedi, & Dasgupta, 2014). Of these, the CAPEC and Carnegie-Mellon 
frameworks contain representative mappings of threats to mitigations, but there is currently no 
published comprehensive source of threat-mitigation mappings.  
Document-Driven Decision Support Systems 
Casting our research problem as an information retrieval (IR) problem gives rise to three 
veins of DSS research for investigation: (1) using classification to judge whether each item in 
the mitigation corpus should be included in or excluded from a particular threat’s mitigation 
set, (2) using a retrieval/ranking model such as commonly used in search engines to enumerate 
mitigations ranked according to their likelihood of relevance to the threat, and (3) some 
combination of the two. Lacking existing research dealing specifically with automated 
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matching of mitigations to cyber threats, our discussion here considers supportive analogous 
research. 
Classification. Classification is a supervised machine learning technique in which a 
new item is assigned to its appropriate category by a classifier, an algorithm or model which 
has been trained to make such decisions after learning from training data consisting of items 
whose categories are already known. Classification-based document selection has been 
researched extensively in the context of the medical systematic reviews (SRs) underpinning 
evidence-based medicine. A number of studies have demonstrated the viability of using 
supervised machine learning classification to reduce manual workload in the abstract triage 
process for updating existing SRs (Aphinyanaphongs & Aliferis, 2003; Bañez et al., 2016; 
Bekhuis & Demner-Fushman, 2012; Bekhuis, Tseytlin, Mitchell, & Demner-Fushman, 2014; 
Cohen, Hersh, Peterson, & Yen, 2006; Frunza, Inkpen, & Matwin, 2010; García Adeva, Pikatza 
Atxa, Ubeda Carrillo, & Ansuategi Zengotitabengoa, 2014; Howard et al., 2016; Liu, Timsina, 
& El-Gayar, 2016; Matwin, Kouznetsov, Inkpen, Frunza, & O’Blenis, 2010; Mo, Kontonatsios, 
& Ananiadou, 2015; Shemilt et al., 2014; Timsina, Liu, & El-Gayar, 2016). Updating SRs has 
historically entailed a labor-intensive, time-consuming, multi-step process in which subject 
matter experts attempt to identify and down-select from the massive corpus of medical research 
all research pertinent to a particular medical question so that the research can be synthesized to 
answer the question. During the initial stage in the selection process, known as broad screening 
or abstract triage, human experts must review and make relevant/not-relevant judgments on 
many thousands of abstracts returned by an initial keyword search. The goal of the triage stage 
is to exclude those abstracts that are obviously irrelevant, but include the rest for further 
consideration in the second stage. The triage stage demands high recall3 (>95% (Cohen et al., 
2006)) to ensure all relevant research is considered, but is less stringent about precision, 
tolerating a few false positives. This reflects the customs of the problem domain: It is 
unacceptable to overlook research relevant to the problem for this could impact the overall 
quality of the SR. On the other hand, it is tolerable to include some potentially irrelevant 
documents because these will be screened out by human reviewers in the next stage of the 
                                                 
3
 Recall is the ratio of relevant records retrieved to the total relevant records in the corpus. Precision is the ratio 
of relevant records retrieved to total records retrieved (Singhal, 2001). 
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process (Matwin et al., 2010). Comprehensiveness and currency of SRs is confounded by the 
large, continually-evolving, and highly technical nature of medical literature. In addition, SRs 
typically operate on a large corpus of candidate studies where only a small percentage (e.g. 
<15%) will ultimately be true positives selected for inclusion in the synthesis (Kontonatsios et 
al., 2017; Shemilt et al., 2014), a condition known as imbalance.  
The document selection process for SRs bears stark similarities to our research problem 
in which we have a large corpus of continually-evolving, highly technical cybersecurity 
literature and we want to present mitigation documents for a given threat while omitting those 
that are extraneous. Moreover, like SRs, threat-mitigation matching operates on an imbalanced 
corpus of candidate mitigations where only a small percentage are relevant to any particular 
threat. A key similarity between selecting literature for a SR and selecting mitigations for a 
threat may be the value judgment that high recall is more important than high precision. We 
elect to favor recall in the precision-recall tradeoff for the same reason this choice was made in 
the case of medical SRs and we assume that a few false positives can be manually screened out, 
if necessary.  
Ranked Retrieval. Commonly used in search engines, ranked retrieval considers 
relevance between a query and a document, not as a binary concept, but as a matter of degree. 
A retrieval model assigns a relevance score to each query-document pair via a ranking function. 
When ordered in descending sequence by the relevance score, those documents at the top of the 
list are the documents deemed to be most relevant to the query. Unfortunately, for purposes of 
making binary relevant/non-relevant decisions using ranked results, one must determine a cut-
off point in the ordered list. This is a challenging problem because, in general, the number of 
relevant results expected  is not known a-priori (Manning, Raghavan, & Schutze, 2009). 
Similarity-based text retrieval models judge the relevance of document to a query in a 
manner that does not require all the words in the query to be present in the document. The 
Vector Space Model is a well-known document representation scheme in text retrieval. Each 
document is represented as a vector of the document words or terms where each word has a 
weight indicating its overall importance in the document. Some common weighting schemes 
are binary (term presence or absence), term frequency (TF, the number of times the term appears 
in the document), and term frequency/inverse document frequency (TFIDF), a technique that 
counterbalances the term frequency with a factor accounting for the total number of documents 
12 
that contain the term. When aggregated, the document vectors form a term-document matrix 
that can be manipulated using matrix mathematics. The Vector Space Model represents the 
corpus of document vectors in a common vector space in which the similarity between two 
documents or between a document and a query can be calculated via a distance measure known 
as cosine similarity (Manning et al., 2009; Turtle & Croft, 1992). The result of testing the 
similarity of a query to a corpus of documents will be a ranked ordering of the documents from 
most to least similar based on the individual words in the documents. 
Latent semantic analysis (LSA) (also called latent semantic indexing (LSI) in some 
contexts) is another similarity-based retrieval model. It a statistical technique that attempts to 
address language complexity, such as synonymy, by considering the term-document 
relationships as a statistical distribution representing an “underlying latent structure” of the 
document corpus (Deerwester, Dumais, Furnas, Landauer, & Harshman, 1990). In LSA, the 
term-document matrix is transformed via singular-value decomposition (SVD) resulting in a 
semantic space representing the “major associative patterns” (Deerwester et al., 1990) in the 
corpus. This semantic space contains the “best K orthogonal factors” (Foltz, 1990) which 
approximate the original document matrix and, importantly, the most closely associated terms 
and documents are clustered near one another such that terms that did not appear in a given 
document (e.g. synonyms) may still be located near the document due to overall word 
association patterns. Deerwester et al. observed substantial improvement for LSA-based text 
retrieval over keyword-based retrieval. They also noted as a practical matter that the 
transformed matrix is substantially smaller than the original term-document matrix, requiring 
only 50-150 factors compared with the hundreds or thousands of words typical of a large 
document corpus.  
Several studies analogous to our present research utilized similarity-based ranked 
retrieval to perform technical document matching, two based on keywords and one based on 
LSA. Swanson et al. (Swanson & Smalheiser, 1997) developed an automated method based on 
keyword searching for linking complementary sets of articles in the MEDLINE database. In 
another study, Goldrich et al. (Goldrich et al., 2014) applied search engine technology, 
including Apache Lucene (Apache Foundation, 2018), keyword matching, key phrases, query 
expansion with synonyms, and the WordNet lexical database (Miller, 1995; Princeton 
University, 2017) to match cybersecurity requirements stated as text to descriptions of research 
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projects in order to point out research aligned with the requirements. Finally, Foltz (Foltz, 1990) 
applied LSA to find new relevant documents in a corpus based on an existing profile of 
documents that had been previously deemed relevant. Foltz first constructed a semantic space 
of articles a priori deemed relevant. To determine if a new document was relevant, it was first 
transformed to the semantic space of relevant articles. Then, if its nearest neighbor was another 
relevant document or if it was neighbors with more relevant articles than non-relevant articles 
it was relevant. Using the nearest neighbor approach and averaging the precision at 3 levels of 
recall (.25, .5, and .75), Foltz’s LSA-based method demonstrated between 13% and 25% 
improvement in retrieval results on three data sets over keyword matching based on 190-240 
dimensions.  
Hybrid Approaches. A few authors have explored the combined use of classification 
and ranked retrieval techniques in text mining. For example, Manning et al. (Manning et al., 
2009) discussed an approach for machine-learned relevance scoring where each training data 
instance consists of query terms (q), a document (d) reference, a binary judgment of the 
relevance of d to q, the cosine similarity (s) of d and q and the query term proximity between d 
and q. Nakamoto (Nakamoto, 2011) discussed a concept similar to Manning et al., except using 
Okapi BM25 (Robertson, Walker, Jones, Hancock-Beaulieu, & Gatford, 1994) and PageRank 
scores as features (instead of relevance and cosine similarity) and returning a relevance ranking 
instead of a binary decision. Wiener et al. (Wiener, Pedersen, & Weigend, 1995) utilized LSI 
for feature reduction instead of term selection (picking a representative subset of the original 
terms) to identify topics using a neural network classifier in a corpus consisting of more than 
11,000 unique terms. Gee (Gee, 2003) described a method for classifying email as spam or not-
spam using an  “LSI-inspired” ensemble classifier implemented in three stages, where the stages 
are similar to Foltz (Foltz, 1990). Gee’s method achieved very high (>0.98) precision and recall 
on both the spam and not-spam classes when tested using just the nearest neighbor classification 
strategy, just the majority strategy, and the two strategies in ensemble with the tie-breaker logic. 
IR Evaluation. The ability to evaluate the effectiveness of a machine learning approach 
is crucial to ensuring that the results are useful and not just a manifestation of chance. As we 
have cast our research as an information retrieval problem, we now consider IR evaluation 
methods. The documents in the corpus will fall into one of four categories at the conclusion of 
a particular query: retrieved and relevant or true positive (TP), retrieved but not relevant or false 
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positive (FP), not retrieved but relevant or false negative (FN), and not retrieved/not relevant 
or true negative (TN). Accuracy, precision, and recall are the most common measures of 
effectiveness in IR. They are all proportions with values between 0 and 1 inclusive based on 
the above categorization of retrieval results (Manning et al., 2009). Powers points out a bias in 
that these common measures tend to understate a method’s ability to correctly identify non-
relevant instances (Powers, 2007). The ability to rule out non-relevant instances can be a useful 
measure of workload reduction. 
Accuracy is the proportion of correctly classified items (TP + TN) to all items (TP + TN 
+ FP + FN). It is generally a poor measure of IR effectiveness because it does not distinguish 
success between the relevant (R) and non-relevant (NR) document classes. In particular, 
accuracy is heavily swayed in cases where the data is imbalanced, which is almost always the 
situation in IR. For example, a method that arbitrarily classifies all documents as NR would 
appear highly accurate in a corpus with 90% NR documents (Manning et al., 2009) even though 
it would incorrectly classify all the R documents. 
Precision is the proportion of retrieved and relevant items (TP) to all retrieved items 
(TP + FP) also called confidence in some fields. Recall is the proportion of retrieved and 
relevant items (TP) to all relevant items (TP + FN) also called true positive rate or sensitivity. 
There is an inverse relationship between precision and recall such that when one goes up the 
other goes down. The weighted harmonic mean of precision and recall (F-measure) is a measure 
used to trade-off precision and recall. The balanced F measure weights precision and recall 
equally but weights can be set to emphasize one over the other if desired. The area under a 
precision-recall curve (AUC) and the balanced F-measure are often used as measures of IR 
effectiveness when balanced performance is sought (Manning et al., 2009; Powers, 2007; 
Raghavan, Jung, & Bollman, 1989).  
Because an IR query commonly results in a ranked list of retrieved results, the expected 
number of which is not known in advance, computation of a single overall precision and 
especially recall can be challenging. In IR precision/recall data points can instead be considered 
at each new relevant document in the ranked list. This gives rise to measures such as R-precision 
or precision at a selected recall value (P@R or P(R), e.g. P(R=0.9)), and precision at rank (P@K 
or P(K)), which is the precision calculated assuming a cut-off at a fixed location in the ranked 
list. In user-facing search applications, it is widely accepted that the user generally only looks 
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at the first page of search results; hence, P@K is often used to measure search effectiveness in 
user-facing search applications. Because of the arbitrary fixed cut-off, P@K does not take into 
account the variability in number of relevant results and thus it can be skewed when the actual 
number of relevant entries is much greater or less than the fixed cut-off. R-precision 
compensates for this weakness of P@K, essentially by computing P@K where K is the number 
of relevant entries that must be returned to achieve the desired recall (Manning et al., 2009; 
Raghavan et al., 1989). 
Sensitivity and specificity are measures used in fields such medicine and behavioral 
science to judge the effectiveness of diagnostic tests. Sensitivity (or equivalently, true positive 
rate, recall, probability of detection) is the proportion of true positives to all positive instances 
or the extent to which actual positive instances are not ignored. In contexts where the objective 
is to correctly identify all positives, such as medicine, recall is a primary evaluation metric 
(Powers, 2007). Specificity (true negative rate) is the proportion of true negatives to all negative 
instances or the extent to which actual negative instances are classified as such  (Altman & 
Bland, 1994). In contexts where the objective is to rule out large swaths of negative instances, 
such as SRs, specificity can be an effective evaluation measure. The fallout (or false positive 
rate) is the proportion of false positives to all negative instances, i.e. the probability that a non-
relevant document will be retrieved. 
The best evaluation measures can only be chosen by considering the requirements of 
the particular IR scenario. We discuss the evaluation methods we have chosen for our research 
in Chapter 3. In some applications, recall may be more important than precision (e.g. medical 
SRs and threat-mitigation matching) or vice versa. Recall should be emphasized when it is 
essential not to miss any relevant documents and some false positives can be tolerated. On the 
other hand, precision should be emphasized when a subset of documents is sufficient to answer 
the request (Manning et al., 2009). Finally, according to Raghavan et al. the “usefulness of a 
retrieval system is determined to a great extent by how closely it can characterize the 
dichotomy” of relevant vs non-relevant documents for its intended purpose (Raghavan et al., 
1989). 
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Summary 
In the Literature Review we discussed threat-informed cyber risk assessment and 
mitigation selection optimization approaches to delineate the boundaries of the gap that our 
research addresses. Casting the research problem as an information retrieval problem, we 
identified pertinent research upon which to build. This includes a robust body of work applying 
classification techniques to medical systematic reviews, a modest body of work applying 
similarity-based techniques to technical document matching, and examples of combining the 
two. Finally, we explored the literature supporting evaluation methods in DSS and IR. In 
subsequent chapters we will refer back to this existing theory as a basis for our research. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Design Science Research 
We selected the Design Science Research Model (DSRM) (Hevner & March, 2004; 
Peffers et al., 2007) as the research framework within which to organize our research. DSRM  
attempts to solve so-called “wicked problems” through the development and evaluation of IT 
artifacts (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2004).  
 
Figure 2. DSRM Model from (Peffers et al., 2007) 
Peffers et al. describe an iterative process with six stages as illustrated in Figure 2. In 
Table 1, we enumerate the DSRM stages and demonstrate the alignment of our research to 
them. The DSRM is appropriate for this research because we want to create an IT artifact to 
solve a challenging problem for which a solution will contribute to theory and practice.  
Table 1. DSRM Stages and Alignment 
Stage  Alignment 
1 Identify and 
motivate the 
problem 
In Chapter 1 we identified and motivated the threat-
mitigation matching problem and discussed our proposed 
contributions. These are crucial steps in the DSRM because 
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Stage  Alignment 
they establish problem relevance, where relevance is judged 
in the context of a “heretofore unsolved and important” 
problem for a “constituent community” of IS practitioners 
(Hevner & March, 2004). 
2 Define objectives of 
a solution 
In Chapter 3 (this chapter) we define the objectives of a 
solution to our research problem. The objectives provide a 
preview of the desired end state and set the stage for artifact 
evaluation. 
3 Design and develop 
the artifact 
iteratively and based 
on existing theory 
In Chapter 2, we discussed pertinent literature. The DSRM 
requires that we draw upon existing research as the basis for 
the artifact; the Literature Review paved the way for doing 
so. Later in Chapter 3 (this chapter) we discuss our iterative 
approach to design and development, synthesizing from the 
cyber and DSS domains. 
4 Demonstrate the 
artifact by using it to 
solve an instance of 
the problem 
In Chapter 4, we describe the artifact (method) and discuss 
the results of applying instantiations of the method to solve 
five test instances of the problem. 
5 Evaluate how well 
the artifact solves 
the problem; iterate 
back to design 
In Chapter 4, we evaluate the effectiveness of the artifact 
using evaluation measures drawn from the literature. In 
Chapter 5, we summarize our contributions and propose 
future work. These discussions set the stage for future 
iterations of design in the spirit of the DSRM. 
6 Communicate results 
to scholarly and 
practitioner 
communities 
This dissertation and the associated defense presentation 
satisfy the DSRM requirement for communication. We 
designed the artifact using rigorous, practitioner-accepted 
modeling techniques to facilitate communication to both 
scholarly and practitioner communities. 
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Objectives of a Solution 
Defining the objectives of a solution to the research problem at hand is an important 
predecessor to artifact design because it previews the desired end state. Objectives also provide 
the foundation on which to build an evaluation strategy. A solution to our research problem 
described above will: 
• Process existing English language text documents where each separately describes 
either a threat or a mitigation (e.g. threat models, practice manuals, control catalogs, 
vendor product white papers) 
• Provide an automated method for recommending (matching) relevant mitigations when 
presented with a threat 
• Match a high percentage of relevant mitigations for a given threat while avoiding 
selection of non-relevant mitigations 
• Accommodate (be extensible to) new and evolving threats and mitigations,  
• Provide utility to cybersecurity experts in mitigation selection, and 
• Be able to be used in a system that allows for reuse of the artifact and the matches 
produced by the artifact. 
Theoretical Background 
The DSRM emphasizes design and evaluation rigor through building upon existing 
research from the literature. Because knowledge about threats and mitigations is largely 
expressed in unstructured or semi-structured text documents, our idea is to cast the threat-
mitigation problem as an information retrieval problem, using the threat as a query and the 
mitigation documents as the corpus to be searched, and then build on applicable DSS research. 
Applying techniques described in the literature we considered artifact designs from three 
categories for the threat-mitigation matcher: 
1. Classification. Drawing from the medical SRs research, approaches based on 
classifying mitigation documents as relevant or not relevant to a given threat 
2. Ranked Retrieval. Drawing from (Swanson & Smalheiser, 1997), (Goldrich et al., 
2014), and Foltz (Foltz, 1990), approaches based on ranked retrieval, and 
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3. Hybrid. Drawing from (Manning et al., 2009), (Nakamoto, 2011), and (Gee, 2003), 
hybrid approaches that combine techniques from ranked retrieval in conjunction with 
classification. 
In Chapter 4, we describe an iterative process wherein we experiment with several 
artifact instantiations in each design category. We discuss the results of these trials, which 
instantiations we decided to advance, which we left behind, and why, with evaluation criteria 
drawn from the theoretical bases discussed in the Evaluation section of the Literature Review. 
Design and Development of the Artifact 
The nature of design is best described as a cycle consisting of brainstorming ideas and 
testing them against the solution objectives (Simon, 1997), continuously refining ideas until the 
desired end state is reached. Prototyping, solution validation, and feedback are emphasized, 
aligning with the iterative nature of Design Science Research and, importantly, helps 
distinguish Design Science Research from routine professional design (Hevner & Chatterjee, 
2010). In Chapter 4, we discuss highlights of the iterative design process we followed during 
development of our artifact. 
The DSRM requires that artifact be constructed and evaluated with rigor (Hevner & 
March, 2004). To promote design rigor, we have drawn from research and practice in the cyber 
risk assessment, mitigation optimization analysis, and DSS domains, as discussed in the 
preceding Literature Review. Moreover, we represented design using the unified modeling 
language (UML) (Booch, Rumbaugh, & Jacobson, 2000) and entity-relationship drawings 
(ERD) (Chen, 1976). These are rigorous methods for modeling software that are commonly 
accepted and understood in the IS practitioner community. In addition, we designed the artifact 
using object-oriented software practices intended to increase modularity, improve quality, and 
make designs and software more resilient to evolution. The artifact produced by this research 
is described in Chapter 4. An architecture for the practical use of the artifact is described in 
Appendix C. We touch on evaluation rigor briefly here and more fully in Chapter 4. 
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Demonstration and Evaluation Plan 
In the DSRM, demonstration and evaluation work together to show that the artifact 
effectively solves the problem. Hevner and March state a number of evaluation methods that 
top the rigor threshold, classifying them into the following categories: observational (e.g. case 
or field study), analytical (e.g. quantitative comparisons, such as of time or cost), experiment 
or simulation, testing, and descriptive (e.g. argument or scenarios) (Hevner & March, 2004). In 
the present research, we demonstrate instantiations of the artifact by applying them to a corpus 
based on the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) dataset version 
2.11 (MITRE, 2017a). Table 2 summarizes our evaluation plan, including artifact evaluation 
criteria aligned with the solution objectives. To ensure evaluation rigor, the evaluation methods 
are drawn from among those given by Hevner and specific performance measures are drawn 
from the DSS and IR domains. Note that the most important objective is the third one as the 
others are only germane after the artifact achieves satisfactory matching performance. Utility is 
also important as we wish to solve a practical problem. The results of artifact evaluation are 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
Table 2. Solution Objectives with Evaluation Methods and Criteria 
 
Objective Evaluation Criteria 
Process existing English language text 
documents where each separately 
describes either a threat or a mitigation. 
Testing: Demonstrate that the instantiated 
artifact accepts English language text 
documents about threats and mitigations. 
Provide an automated method for 
recommending (matching) relevant 
mitigations when presented with a threat. 
Testing: Demonstrate that the instantiated 
artifact will propose matching mitigations 
when a threat is given. 
Match all or nearly all of the relevant 
mitigations for a given threat while 
avoiding selection of non-relevant 
mitigations. 
Analytical: Achieve acceptable performance 
measures on test data. We emphasize high 
recall to retrieve nearly all relevant 
mitigations. We emphasize moderate to high 
precision and low false positives to avoid 
selecting non-relevant mitigations. 
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Objective Evaluation Criteria 
Accommodate (be extensible to) new and 
evolving threats and mitigations. 
Descriptive: Describe how the artifact is 
extensible for future threats and mitigations 
Analytical: Achieve acceptable performance 
measures on test data. 
Provide utility to cybersecurity experts in 
mitigation selection. 
Descriptive: Integrate results of performance, 
extensibility, and reuse evaluations to make a 
logical argument about utility. We emphasize 
high sensitivity to rule out most non-relevant 
mitigations leading to reduced workload for 
the CSE. 
Be able to be used in a system that allows 
for reuse of the artifact and the matches 
produced by the artifact. 
Descriptive: Describe how the artifact is 
reusable and how the knowledge produced by 
the artifact is reusable. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Data Source Description 
We used version 2.11 of the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification 
(CAPEC) dataset (MITRE, 2017a) as the data source for this research. The CAPEC dataset is 
available for download and can also be browsed online (MITRE, 2017b). CAPEC is an existing 
corpus of attach patterns (i.e. threats) expressed in English language documents packaged in an 
XML structure. Although mitigation mapping is not the focus of CAPEC, some attack patterns 
include illustrative mitigations. CAPEC contains a hierarchical representation of attack 
patterns, where the highest level consists of meta attack patterns. These are architecture/design-
focused and not based on specific technologies or implementations. Each meta pattern 
decomposes into several standard attack patterns, which are more detailed and include 
information about the goal of and technique used in the attack. Each standard pattern 
decomposes into detailed patterns, which are the most granular. For our purpose, we focus on 
the standard patterns, which strike a good middle ground between the meta and detailed patterns 
and are most representative of the level of specificity for threats in the cyber risk assessment 
domain. There are 127 standard threats in CAPEC. There are approximately 600 mitigation 
texts in the corpus. The number of mitigations mapped to each standard threat varies from 0 to 
about 10. These mappings are intended to be representative and not comprehensive as threat-
mitigation mapping is not the intent of CAPEC. 
CAPEC has existed in the cybersecurity community since 2007. We consider the 
CAPEC threat-mitigation mappings to be ground truth and we recognize that the quality of the 
data is key to our results. While we do not have objective evidence of the quality of the CAPEC 
threats, mitigations, and mappings, we accept CAPEC’s heritage as an indicator of sufficient 
quality for this proof of concept research. By personal inspection, we searched CAPEC for 
threats which had at least a paragraph of descriptive text and about 10 relevant mitigations for 
use as labeled data. We were able to find five threats and associated mitigations which are 
24 
suitable test cases for our purpose. We also found some weaknesses in this data source, which 
we discuss below. 
We used XML parsing to decompose CAPEC into its component threat documents, 
mitigation documents, and mappings between the two. During parsing, we preserved selected 
information from the document structure (e.g. title, description, threat category) per related 
work (Cohen, 2008; Matwin et al., 2010; Mo et al., 2015; Small, Wallace, Brodley, & 
Trikalinos, 2011) which suggests that certain parts of the document may yield impactful 
features for classification. The following data was extracted from CAPEC for threat documents: 
• ID # 
• Title (free text) 
• Description (free text) 
• Abstraction level (meta, standard, detailed) 
• Domain of attack 
• Mechanism of attack 
• Parent attack pattern 
• Immediate children attack patterns 
The following data was extracted from CAPEC for mitigation documents: 
• ID # 
• Title (constructed by taking first 75 characters of the description) 
• Description (free text) 
The following data was extracted from CAPEC for existing threat-mitigation mappings. 
A subset of these mappings was used as labeled data for training models and the rest was used 
for testing. 
• Threat ID # 
• Mitigation ID # 
• Relevant/not relevant indicator 
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Strengths of the CAPEC data for our purpose include detailed threat descriptions, 
metadata including categorical and hierarchical relationships, open4 accessibility, and available 
threat-mitigation mappings. The CAPEC data has several key weaknesses when considered for 
our application. We highlight those weaknesses and the work-arounds we implemented here. 
First, the threat documents are more robust in length and content than the mitigation documents. 
Since we want to treat the threat as a query, the opposite situation would have been better. 
Second, the data is imbalanced; that is, there are a relatively small number of relevant mitigation 
instances per threat compared to non-relevant instances. We lessened this weakness by drawing 
in some additional mitigations from other sources. Third, and perhaps most concerning, the 
quality and style of the prose within the threat and mitigation documents varies significantly 
from one document to the next. For document-driven DSS methods to produce good threat-
mitigation matches, the threats and mitigations must both be well-described. We addressed this 
weakness by selecting a handful of the best quality threat documents from CAPEC to use as 
our demonstration cases. Fourth, we found a few situations where, due to human error, the 
mappings were erroneous. Since we rely on the mappings as ground truth, we corrected the 
errors manually. Finally, we had initially hoped to utilize the Domain of Attack and/or 
Mechanism of Attack metadata in CAPEC as features to support classification in a manner 
similar to the way the Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) (Lowe & Barnett, 1994) support 
classification for medical SRs (Timsina et al., 2016). Unfortunately, the existence of this 
metadata within the CAPEC proved to be insufficient for our purpose, so we had to abandon 
this idea.  
Although the CAPEC weaknesses represent minor inconveniences, they do not 
invalidate our research because our research is not specifically about the CAPEC data; it is 
more generally about the concept of threat-mitigation document matching. CAPEC is simply a 
vehicle, a convenient source of labeled data (the only non-proprietary source we could find). 
Finally, we note that none of the above criticism is meant to detract from the value of the 
CAPEC data for its original intended purpose. We acknowledge their efforts to produce it and 
thank them for making their work openly available for use. 
                                                 
4
 “The MITRE Corporation (MITRE) hereby grants you a non-exclusive, royalty-free license to use Common 
Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC™) for research, development, and commercial purposes. 
Any copy you make for such purposes is authorized provided that you reproduce MITRE’s copyright designation 
and this license in any such copy.” (MITRE, 2017a) 
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Iterative Design 
In this section, we discuss highlights of the iterative design and experimentation that led 
to our artifact and instantiations.  At the outset, we had three design concepts for the threat-
mitigation matcher: classification, ranked retrieval, and a hybrid of the two. We explored a 
number of designs, including various classifiers, feature sets, and feature reduction techniques. 
Details of the design iterations are contained in Appendix D and summarized in the next few 
sections.  
We used precision, recall, and the rate of false positives to judge the merits of each 
design. We chose these measures because they are among the ones most commonly used to 
compare text classifiers and retrieval models. In mitigation selection, omitting a relevant 
mitigation (recall error or false negative) means a useful mitigation could be overlooked. On 
the other hand, including a non-relevant mitigation (precision error or false positive) means the 
CSE may be presented with a mitigation that does not actually protect against the threat. While 
both are undesirable situations, we emphasize recall (i.e. to present all relevant mitigations) in 
our artifact with the assumption that a few false positives are tolerable and we can rely on the 
CSE to reject them during the screening phase (similar to the process for medical SRs).  
Tool Choices 
For some of the classification designs, we used the Waikato Environment for 
Knowledge Analysis (Weka) data mining toolkit presented by the University of Waikato 
(Kaluža, 2013). We selected this toolkit because it is well-known in data mining, remains under 
active development and use, has a robust user interface for experimentation, and also has a Java 
application programming interface (API) which we found attractive for practical purposes. In 
particular, we used the Weka SMO classifier, which implements the sequential minimal 
optimization algorithm for training a support vector classifier as described in (Platt, 1998). We 
also utilized scikit-learn, a Python machine learning environment (Pedregosa, Weiss, & 
Brucher, 2011) developed under the auspices of INRIA (“About us,” 2019) for some 
classification trials. We selected this toolkit because it is well-known in data mining, remains 
under active development and use, is well-documented, has a robust API, and supports some 
additional evaluation methods beyond what we could obtain from Weka. In scikit-learn we used 
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C-support vector classification (SVC). Both Weka SMO and scikit-learn SVC are based on 
LIBSVM (Chang & Lin, 2018), the most common SVM library. 
For the keyword/phrase-based designs, we used the keyword/phrase extraction library 
implemented by Paco Nathan (Nathan, 2010). It is based on the TextRank algorithm described 
in (Mihalcea & Tarau, 2004).  
For some of the ranked retrieval designs, we used the Apache Lucene (Apache 
Foundation, 2013) implementation of the Vector Space Model. We selected Apache Lucene 
because it is well-known, actively developed, well-documented, and has a robust Java API. For 
other ranked retrieval trials, we used the Gensim topic modeling toolkit presented by Radim 
Rehurek (Rehurek, 2018). We selected Gensim primarily for its LSA implementation. It is well-
known, actively developed, and well-documented. It is implemented in Python and has a robust 
API that facilitates integration into an overall architecture. 
 “One for All” Designs 
We initially wondered if there was a way to implement a “one for all” approach where 
a single matcher would determine relevant mitigations for any threat contained in the corpus. 
We explored this concept in two hybrid designs, a SVM classifier based on LSA features and a 
three-stage voting classifier also based on LSA (Gee, 2003). These are discussed in more detail 
in Appendix D. Neither of the “one for all” designs produced results better than random 
guessing. Intuition suggests that the relationship between one threat and its relevant mitigations 
may be different from the next threat/mitigations, such that combining many such relationships 
in a single semantic space may dilute the relationships. Thus, we abandoned the “one for all” 
avenue of investigation and proceeded on the “per threat” route.  
“Per Threats” Designs 
Following the medical SR literature discussed in the Literature Review, we started with 
a single threat and some labeled mitigation data that contained instances relevant and not 
relevant to the threat. We had an intuition that the best approach for one threat would also work 
for other threats. In order for the “per threat” approach to solve the problem at hand, we would 
have to eventually train a classifier for each existing threat and likewise for new threats that 
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come along; however, this does not seem like an unreasonable requirement. First, while new 
threats do come along, the set of known threats is relatively stable over time. In the ten months 
since we started this research, the CAPEC dataset has undergone two subsequent releases but 
only two new standard threats have been added to CAPEC in that time. Second, building the 
classifiers can eventually be automated using the API provided by the machine learning toolkits. 
By browsing threats using the online version of the CAPEC dataset (MITRE, 2017b), 
we selected threat 49, password brute force guessing, as our first test case. We selected this 
threat because it had robust descriptive text and at least 10 relevant mitigations in the labeled 
data. Figure 3 shows a summary of the precision, recall, and false positive rates (cross-
validation statistics) for several “per threat” designs. The bracketed [C], [TR], and [H] in the 
design names indicate the design concept: classification, text retrieval, or hybrid. For the 
classification and hybrid approaches, we show the cross-validation statistics for both the R and 
NR class. For the text retrieval designs, it is customary to evaluate based just on relevant results 
retrieved.  
 
Figure 3. Summary of “Per Threat” Iterations 
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“Per Threat” Classification 
We initially tested several classifiers before finally deciding to go forward with SVM. 
SVM has been shown to perform favorably for text classification, especially when the number 
of positive instances per category is small (Platt, 1998) and the feature set is large (Joachims, 
1998).  We discuss our selection of SVM further in the upcoming Artifact Design and Rationale 
sections. We experimented with two classification strategies for the “per threat” approach, one 
using the full text of the mitigations and the other using threat keywords/phrases. 
Full text strategy. We investigated SVM classification of the full mitigation text. We 
performed tokenization of the text, removed numbers and punctuation, converted the text to 
lower case, stemmed, removed stop words, and retained the most frequent 1,000 words as 
TFIDF features plus the R/NR label. The corpus consisted of about 600 mitigation instances, 9 
of which were relevant. We evaluated models with and without an information gain filter for 
feature reduction. As shown in Figure 3, the best of full text models had high precision (0.92), 
no false positives, but unacceptably low recall (0.48) on the R class. On the NR class, precision 
and recall were very high (>0.99) but with a 50% false positive rate. The model was very good 
at correctly classifying non-relevant instances, partially due to the class imbalance in the data, 
but it was not good at correctly classifying relevant instances, likely for the same reason. It 
became apparent that it was necessary to do something about the class imbalance. In addition, 
note that this approach does not utilize any information from the threat; thus, such an approach 
may not generalize to other threats.  
Keywords/phrases strategy. An inspection of the mitigation text for the relevant 
examples revealed that those which were correctly classified in the full-text strategy have in 
common some words from threat 49 suggesting keywords/phrases as a possible way to 
introduce information from the threat text into the approach, while also potentially improving 
the classification results. We used an implementation of TextRank (Nathan, 2010) to 
automatically extract keywords/phrases from the threat text. Some of these keywords/phrases 
were rather rough, so we decided to clean them up manually. Then we converted the 
keywords/phrases to lower case and removed stop words. We made an intentional decision not 
to stem the keywords/phrases, but in some cases we included important variances as keywords 
in their own right. Next, we investigated techniques to address the class imbalance in the data 
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(Cohen et al., 2006; Miwa, Thomas, O’Mara-Eves, & Ananiadou, 2014; Timsina et al., 2016). 
The most obvious solution was to supplement the relevant mitigations, so we extracted about a 
dozen additional documents relevant to threat 49 from the Internet and added them to the data. 
We also performed two-thirds random undersampling of the dominant (NR) class to reduce the 
NR instances and 100% Synthetic Minority Oversampling Technique (SMOTE) (He & Garcia, 
2009; Liu et al., 2016) of the R class to increase the R instances. The SMOTE technique creates 
new instances of the minority class by drawing features from the K (e.g., 5) nearest minority 
neighbors based on Euclidean distance in the feature space. Undersampling can result in 
information loss while oversampling can lead to overfitting; however, due to the extreme 
imbalance, these were risks worth taking. 
For this trial, the features consisted of threat 49 keyword/phrase counts. After balancing, 
the corpus consisted of about 220 mitigation instances, 20 of which were relevant. We used 
several different methods for determining the keyword/phrase counts, including a simple count 
of the times a keyword/phrase appeared in the mitigation document (TF), TFIDF, TF divided 
by the total number of words in the document, and 0 or 1 to indicate the keyword/phrase is 
present or absent in the document. Of these, the presence/absence approach yielded the best 
model. As shown in Figure 3, the best of the keyword/phrase models had high precision (0.97), 
no false positives, and improved recall (0.74) on the R class. On the NR class, precision and 
recall were very high (>0.99) but with a 24% false positive rate. Two important disadvantages 
of this design are as follows: manual intervention is required to extract the threat 
keywords/phrases and recall is still too low. 
We were curious about the potential impact of additional under- and oversampling, so 
we experimented with 3/4 undersampling of the NR class, and 200% oversampling of the R 
class for threat 49. When comparing 3/4 undersampling versus 2/3 undersampling of the NR 
class for the same oversampling percentage (100%) of the R class, the precision, recall, and F-
measure for 2/3 undersampling was better. When we increased oversampling of the R class to 
200%, recall of the R class seemed to improve overall but with a small toll on precision. In the 
200% oversampling case, the model failed to properly classify test samples. These results 
suggest that 3/4 NR undersampling was too much and, when combined with 200% R 
oversampling, the model was becoming overfit to the training data. 
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“Per Threat” Ranked Retrieval 
As a possible alternative to classification, we investigated two ranked retrieval 
approaches to matching relevant mitigations for a given threat similar to (Foltz, 1990; Goldrich 
et al., 2014; Swanson & Smalheiser, 1997). First, we investigated ranking based on the Vector 
Space Model as implemented in Apache Lucene. We also investigated ranking based on Latent 
Semantic Analysis (Deerwester et al., 1990) as implemented in Gensim  (Rehurek, 2018). The 
corpus consisted of about 600 mitigation instances, 25 of which were relevant. As expected per 
the Literature Review, LSA outperformed the Vector Space Model, retrieving 23 of 25 relevant 
items versus 15 of 25. To calculate precision and recall, we cut the ranked list at 25 and used 
the formulas discussed in the Literature Review. The main issue with this approach was lack of 
a general strategy for implementing the R vs NR cut-off point in the ranked list. While the 
number of R instances is known in the training data, it is unknown in the real world, making it 
challenging to choose a generalized cut-off point. 
“Per Threat” Hybrid 
Drawing from (Manning et al., 2009), (Nakamoto, 2011), and (Gee, 2003), we 
experimented with two hybrid approaches that combine ranked retrieval and classification. In 
one approach we used features from an LSA transform of the mitigation text plus the R/NR 
label in conjunction with the SVM classifier. This design was ultimately the one we selected 
for our artifact. We discuss it in greater detail in the upcoming Artifact Design section.  
In the other hybrid approach, we developed a method inspired by Gee (Gee, 2003) and 
Foltz (Foltz, 1990) for classifying mitigations relevant/non-relevant to a given threat. First, we 
used LSA to create a semantic space from a training set of labeled mitigation documents and 
constructed an external index to maintain the known relevance status of each mitigation with 
regard to the threat. Each new mitigation document, Mn, was used as a query against the 
semantic space, returning a ranked list of other mitigation documents similar to Mn from most 
similar to least. The classifier used the ranked list to classify Mn in three stages. First, it was 
classified according to the class of its nearest neighbor in the space (i.e. the existing mitigation 
document whose similarity score is highest). Next, Mn was classified according to class of the 
majority of all results in the ranked list truncated at an arbitrary cut-off, C. Finally, if the 
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majority and nearest neighbor stages agreed, Mn was deemed to be of the nearest neighbor’s 
class. If the majority and nearest neighbor stages did not agree, the dispute was settled by the 
third stage which attempts to detect the skew of Mn towards one class or the other. We 
implemented the first 2 stages using an arbitrary cut-off of top 5, but for the tie-breaker we took 
a simple default. This method yielded precision of 0.63 and recall of 0.83 with 3% false 
positives on the R class and 0.99/0.97/17% for the NR class. Two ties were encountered in the 
NR class indicating the need to consider better tie-breaker logic, but on further experimentation 
we did not observe viable tie-breaking logic so we removed the design from further 
consideration.  
The best of the hybrid models was the design that combined SVM with LSA. This is the 
design on which we ultimately based our artifact. It is discussed in detail in the Artifact Design 
section. The corpus consisted of about 600 mitigation instances before balancing and 100 
instances after balancing, 25 of which were relevant. For threat 49, the method yielded precision 
of 0.95 and recall of 0.76 with 1% false positives on the R class and 0.93/0.99/24% for the NR 
class. Recall was still too low, so we looked to the text to determine options for improvement. 
Analysis of Text 
Success in classifying textual data is heavily influenced by the characteristics of the text 
itself. Having experimented with a few variations, it made sense to pause and look closely at 
the text of threat 49 to gain insights on the matching successes and failures. In the training 
corpus, there were 25 known relevant mitigations for threat 49. Using diagnostic tools, we 
identified the mitigations commonly misclassified in the trials. We investigated these false 
positives (FP) and false negatives (FN) to better understand how they differed from the correctly 
classified instances. One thing the correctly classified instances had in common was that they 
contained text explaining how the mitigation addresses the threat. The false negatives lacked 
this explanatory text. The false positives fell into two categories: (a) some dealt with password 
vulnerabilities but not specifically password brute force guessing and (b) others dealt with brute 
force guessing but not of passwords. We hypothesized that improving the mitigation texts to 
include an explanation of how each one addresses the threat would improve the match results 
by reducing the FNs. Doing so also has practical benefits, allowing the CSE to better understand 
the reason a mitigation is relevant to the threat, to determine its applicability in context, and to 
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better convey the rationale to the decision-makers who fund mitigations. In some applications 
of text mining (e.g. ratings, surveys, news articles), the text “is what it is” and we have to use 
what we find. For threat-mitigation matching, it may be possible to influence the problem space; 
thus, we do have the luxury of recommending improvements to the threat and mitigation 
documents to better support automated matching in the future. With that in mind, we augmented 
the text of the FNs from other sources and then reran selected trials. A comparison of the cross-
validation statistics for models trained on the unimproved and improved text is shown in Figure 
5 and discussed below. In general, models trained with the improved text demonstrated better 
precision and recall in cross-validation statistics than models trained on the unimproved text. 
For threat 49 on the improved text, the method yielded precision of 0.96 and recall of 0.92 with 
1% false positives on the R class and 0.97/0.99/8% for the NR class, leading us to select this 
design as the selected approach for our artifact.  
Artifact Design 
Our artifact is designed to leverage SVM classification and LSA ranked retrieval. The 
selected approach uses as features the R/NR label plus 200 features derived from an LSA 
transform of the mitigation text. Using LSA affords a feature reduction from 1,500 unique 
words in the plain text to 200 LSA topics. Model building is a three-step process, indexing, 
balancing, and training, as illustrated in Figure 4. Note that a model is built for each threat; thus, 
the mitigation documents input into the indexing stage are labeled as R/NR to the specific threat. 
The corpus consisted of about 600 mitigation instances before balancing and 100 instances after 
balancing, 25 of which were relevant. 
In the indexing stage, for each mitigation text, stop words are removed, then the text is 
tokenized, lower-cased, and stemmed. A TFIDF representation of the corpus is computed then 
transformed using Gensim to an LSA semantic space or Latent Semantic Index retaining 200 
topics. This is slightly higher than the number of standard threats in CAPEC and fits with 
optimal LSI dimensionality findings in (Bradford, 2008). Bradford observed favorable results 
when the number of topics was between 200 and 500 for a corpus with millions of documents. 
We selected the low end of Bradford’s range because our corpus is much smaller. The LSA 
semantic space and an index containing the labels are saved for use in similarity queries.  
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During iterative design, we observed that the corpus was highly imbalanced in favor of 
NR instances. In the balancing stage, we utilize LSA similarity scores as a means to balance 
the training data. We query the mitigation LSA space using the full text of the threat document 
(tokenized, stemmed, lower-cased, and transformed to the semantic space) as a query. Then, 
we truncate the training data after the 100th ranked result, retaining the top 100 mitigation entries 
based on similarity to the threat text. This balances the data that will be input into training by 
reducing the number of NR instances. We intuit that this approach is better than simply 
undersampling at random and over-sampling with SMOTE for the following reasons. 
Undersampling at random could drop relevant entries of which we already have too few. 
Oversampling with SMOTE adds new instances to the corpus, but no new knowledge. Because 
the similarity score imparts some knowledge about the semantics of the entries, ingesting the 
most similar entries during training will keep most of the relevant entries and in addition the 
non-relevant entries that are most difficult to discriminate.  
 
Figure 4. Artifact Design and Flow 
In the training stage, we build an SVM classifier using scikit-learn for threat 49 (and 
later for other threats), inputting the top 100 most similar mitigations from the balancing stage 
for threat 49 and their labels into the learning process. The features consist of the LSA 
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representation of each mitigation (200 features) plus the R/NR indicator. We save the models 
for later use to predict the classes of new unlabeled mitigations.  
We utilize the saved model in the predicting stage to classify new potential mitigations 
as relevant or not relevant to the threat associated with the model. First, the text is transformed 
to LSA features relative to the saved LSA space. Then the saved threat-specific classifier is 
applied to label the LSA-transformed mitigations.  Evaluation of the model based on new test 
data is discussed in the upcoming Demonstration and Evaluation section. 
Rationale for Selected Approach 
In this section we discuss our rationale for the design of the selected method. We explain 
why we explored LSA, classification, and a combination of the two, why we selected SVM, 
and why we selected this approach as our method. 
Why LSA? As we saw in the Literature Review section, Latent Semantic Analysis has 
been shown to improve retrieval of relevant documents from a corpus when compared to 
keyword search because LSA accounts for inherent complexities of natural language, including 
synonymy, by evaluating the entire corpus for recurring word patterns. These word patterns are 
used to construct a semantic space (a set of LSA topics) representing the corpus. Each document 
in the corpus is represented according to its degree of similarity with the topics of the space. In 
the literature, LSA is regarded as superior to keyword-based matching. In our experiments, we 
observed that LSA improved the matching of mitigations to threats over keyword-based 
matching, likely due to the cyber documents’ complex word patterns. 
Why Classification? Supervised machine learning classification, is a statistical 
approach for predicting the label or class of a new instance based on a model trained using 
existing instances whose classes are known. The instances are represented by features 
(independent variables) which are used to predict the label (dependent variable). The training 
process analyzes the features and associated labels and detects relationships that allow the class 
to be predicted for new instances represented according to the same features. Two-class 
classification of text documents has been successfully demonstrated in the literature for 
updating medical SRs as well as in our experiments for threat-mitigation matching. Moreover, 
classification does not suffer from the ambiguous cut-off problem encountered in matching by 
text retrieval. 
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Why SVM? SVM has been shown to perform favorably for text classification, 
especially when the number of positive instances per category is small (Platt, 1998). According 
to Joachims (Joachims, 1998), SVM is well-suited to text classification because many topics 
are linearly separable, the typical corpus has high dimensionality but few irrelevant features, 
and each document vector is sparse. Joachims provided experimental evidence that SVM 
“consistently achieved good performance on text classification,” tolerated large feature sets 
without a need for reduction techniques, and did not require parameter tuning. None of our early 
experiments with SVM and other classifiers gave us reason to go against Platt’s and Joachim’s 
findings.   
Why combine LSA and SVM? We used LSA in combination with SVM in our artifact 
for three reasons: (1) to reduce the tendency of the NR class to dominate the model by balancing 
the training data (from >99.99% NR before balancing to about 75% NR after), (2) as a feature 
reduction technique (from >1500 features before the LSA transform to 200 features after), and 
(3) because the LSA features are semantically richer, accounting for synonymy. 
We crafted this design for the above reasons and selected it because of its high precision 
and recall and low false positive rate based on cross-validation statistics, along with the ability 
to fully automate construction of the “per threat” classifiers. The latter is a practical 
consideration; since we will have to build a large number of classifiers for a “per threat” design 
and may want to periodically rebuild the classifiers as new data is labeled, we prefer not to do 
it manually. The next best design was the threat keyword design, but it required manual 
intervention for every threat to extract the keywords.  
Extensibility to Other Threats 
Having seen promising results from the selected design, we wanted to know if these 
results would extend to other CAPEC standard threats. We chose threats 66 (SQL injection), 
134 (email injection), 268 (audit log manipulation), and 593 (session hijacking) according to 
the same criteria we used to select threat 49. Then we compared cross-validation statistics for 
models trained for these five threats before and after text improvement. The left-most five sets 
of bars in Figure 5 show the precision, recall, and false positive rates for models trained for the 
5 test threats before and after the text improvement. In the figure, “U” and “I” stand for 
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unimproved text and improved text, respectively. The rightmost set of bars shows the mean 
precision, recall, and false positive rate averaged across the 5 test threats. At a glance, this figure 
shows that the cross-validation measures are better after the text improvement, except for threat 
268. Because threat 268 had 1.0 precision before the text improvement, precision declined 
slightly as expected when recall went up after the text improvement. As illustrated in Figure 5, 
precision is between 0.86 and 1.0 and recall is between 0.86 and 0.95 for all 5 test threats for 
improved text with false positive rate of 4% or less. Overall, although not a guarantee of 
generality, these classifier cross-validation statistics are favorable.  
 
 
Figure 5. Unimproved vs Improved Text Comparison for 5 Threats 
Solution Architecture and Use Cases 
For the artifact described above and evaluated below to be truly useful to the CSE in the 
context of mitigation selection for cyber risk assessment, it must be incorporated into a system 
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with which the CSE can interact. Appendix B describes the common use cases for the CSE’s 
usage of such a system and Appendix C describes the data model and a high-level architecture 
of such a system as illustrated in Figure 6. The architecture has been designed modularly and 
using object-oriented principles so that any of the threat-mitigation matching techniques 
investigated in this chapter could be incorporated. Some key characteristics of the system 
include the following: (a) provides for models to be saved and reused to label additional 
mitigations (b) persists the threats, mitigations, and known matches in a data store for reuse, (c) 
is extensible to additional threats, and (d) provides a means for the CSE to view, augment, and 
utilize the data. 
 
Figure 6. Solution Architecture 
Demonstration and Evaluation 
Demonstration and evaluation work together to show that the artifact effectively solves 
the problem. Hevner and March (Hevner & March, 2004) state a number of rigorous evaluation 
methods, classifying them into the following categories: observational (e.g. case or field study), 
analytical (e.g. quantitative comparisons, such as of time or cost), experiment or simulation, 
testing, and descriptive (e.g. argument or scenarios). In the present research, we demonstrate 
and evaluate the artifact by applying it to predict the labels for new mitigation documents that 
were held aside and not used for training. The test data set consists of 276 documents, 261 of 
39 
which were extracted from the CAPEC mitigations for threats other than 49, 66, 134, 266, and 
593, and 15 of which were drawn from the Internet, 3 new relevant mitigations for each of the 
5 test threats. We discuss the evaluation of the artifact in the next few paragraphs by revisiting 
each solution objective stated in the Research Methodology section. Quantitative machine 
learning and IR performance metrics are shown in Figure 7 and Table 3. The evaluation 
conclusions are summarized in Table 4. 
 
Figure 7. Test Results – Improved Text 
Objective: Match most of the relevant mitigations for a given threat while avoiding 
selection of non-relevant mitigations. This is one of the most important objectives as the 
others are only germane after the artifact achieves satisfactory matching performance. As 
mentioned in the design section, we experimented with several artifact designs to see which 
obtained the best performance. Thus, we needed some objective measures for comparison. 
Following medical SRs research, we measured recall, precision, false positive rate, specificity, 
and the number of instances correct and incorrectly labeled to evaluate performance of the 
artifact. We applied cross-validation, using the 10-fold approach to obtain these measures 
during the training stage (Altman & Bland, 1994; Bekhuis & Demner-Fushman, 2012; Bekhuis 
et al., 2014; Cohen, 2008; Cohen et al., 2006; García, Mollineda, & Sánchez, 2014; 
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Jonnalagadda & Petitti, 2014; Liu et al., 2016; Matwin et al., 2010; Mo et al., 2015; Su, 1992; 
Timsina et al., 2016).  
During design, we used the cross-validation statistics output during training to compare 
the model designs, deciding which to advance or leave behind. Although suitable for comparing 
models, these measures are not definitive for new document instances. During the evaluation 
stage, we re-evaluated the classifiers on test data held aside and not used during training as is 
customary in machine learning evaluation. We computed the recall, precision, false positive 
rate, and specificity by comparing the predicted and actual labels for the test instances. Figure 
7 and Table 3 show the test results on the improved text for five threats. These results are 
discussed in more detail in the next few paragraphs. 
Recall that training measures yielded precision and recall > 0.93 for the NR class. This 
foreshadowed excellent discernment of the NR class. Although we are most interested in the R 
class, the model’s ability to discriminate NR instances is also a benefit. Test results for precision 
and recall on the NR class lived up to the promises made by the training statistics. In addition, 
all five models had high specificity (97-100%) meaning at least 97% labor savings for the CSE 
when compared to totally manually matching efforts because the models are very good at 
accurately discarding non-relevant documents. 
For the R class, training measures yielded precision between 0.86 and 1.00 (mean 0.94), 
recall between 0.86 and 0.95 (mean 0.90), and FP rate between 0 and 4% (mean 2%). During 
testing, the models all yielded 1.00 recall on the R class, performing better than anticipated 
based on cross-validation statistics. This means each of the models excels at recognizing 
relevant mitigations for its designated threat and thus we are not likely to ignore relevant 
mitigations. Unfortunately, precision during testing was lower than anticipated (between 0.27 
and 0.75, mean 0.40). For the 266 test instances, there were between 0 and 8 false positives (0-
3%) per threat. In practical usage, we can tolerate a few false positives in our approach but, 
similar to the process of medical SRs, we would have to have CSE review of the mitigations 
labeled as relevant as illustrated in the architecture in Figure 3 and Appendix C before recording 
them in a knowledge base as reusable recommendations. 
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Table 3. “Per Threat” Test Summary - Improved Text 
Threat Class Precision P@3 Recall FP  
Rate 
Specificity # 
Correct 
# 
Incorrect 
49 R 
NR 
0.75 
1.00 
1.00 1.00 
1.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.00 
1.00 
3 
272 
0 
1 
66 R 
NR 
0.27 
1.00 
1.00 (*) 1.00 
0.97 
0.02 
0.00 
0.97 
1.00 
3 
265 
0 
8 
134 R 
NR 
0.30 
1.00 
1.00 (*) 1.00 
0.97 
0.03 
0.00 
0.97 
1.00 
3 
266 
0 
7 
268 R 
NR 
0.38 
1.00 
1.00 (*) 1.00 
0.98 
0.02 
0.00 
0.98 
1.00 
3 
268 
0 
5 
593 R 
NR 
0.30 
1.00 
1.00 (*) 1.00 
0.97 
0.03 
0.00 
0.97 
1.00 
3 
266 
0 
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Precision @ K, discussed in the Literature Review, is a measure of precision commonly 
applied in text retrieval applications. We considered P@K for all 5 models; we used K=3 
because we knew in advance that our test data set contained exactly 3 relevant mitigations per 
threat. For threat 49, there were 4 positive predictions, 3 correct and 1 false positive. The correct 
predictions were ranked in the top 3, each with 1.0 probability and the false positive was ranked 
fourth at 0.51 probability. Thus, P@3 for threat 49 is 1.0. For threat 66, there were 11 positive 
predictions, 3 correct and 8 FPs. All 3 of the TPs were ranked at 1.0, but 5 FPs were also ranked 
at 1.0. This complicated the P@K calculation because any of the 8 items ranked 1.0 could be 
in the top 3. We found sparse treatment of tie-breaking for P@K in the literature. A simplistic 
but commonly accepted approach for dealing with ties from TREC5 (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, 2005) is to choose one of the possible orderings and evaluate P@K 
for it. One such ordering is for all the positive instances to be in the top 3 and, thus, P@3 would 
be 1.0. However, this is admittedly very optimistic (indicated with * in Table 3) as other 
arbitrary orderings of the results could yield appreciably different results for P@3, including 
0.0, 0.33, and 0.67. McSherry and Najork proposed an alternative method for computing P@K 
which accounts for ties by averaging P@K over all the possible orderings (McSherry & Najork, 
2008). There are 40,320 possible orderings for the 8 samples labeled positive for threat 66 and 
over half of them would contain 3 NR entries (P@3=0.0). These would drive the average down 
                                                 
5
 For more than 25 years, Text Retrieval Conference (TREC) has been a pre-eminent information retrieval 
conference supporting text retrieval research with large test corpi and uniform scoring procedures to facilitate 
comparison of results. It is sponsored by NIST. https://trec.nist.gov/  
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dramatically; thus, without implementing McSherry’s measure, we estimated that it would be 
not be better than the value in the precision column. Similarly, for threat 134, there were 10 
positive predictions, 9 of which were ranked at 1.0 including the 3 known positives; for threat 
268, there were 6 positive predictions, 6 of which were ranked at 1.0 including the 3 known 
positives; and for threat 593, there were 10 positive predictions, 9 of which were ranked at 1.0 
including the 3 known positives. The bottom line is P@K did not help with evaluation as much 
as we originally thought it would due to the ties. 
We ultimately based evaluation of our artifact on recall, specificity, and false positive 
rate as shown in Figure 7 and Table 3. These measures are defined in Equations 1, 2, and 3. 
Recall is the probability that all relevant documents will be retrieved. Specificity is the 
probability that all non-relevant documents will be ruled out. False positive rate is the 
probability that a non-relevant document will be retrieved. As Powers points out, taken alone, 
precision and recall tend to understate a method’s ability to correctly identify non-relevant 
instances (Powers, 2007). This ability is measured using specificity, and we think it is important 
for threat-mitigation mapping because ruling out true negatives can lead to substantial workload 
reduction for the CSE. 
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In summary, with recall of the R class registering 1.00 on test data for all 5 models, we 
can be confident that the model will not overlook relevant mitigations. This is desirable because 
we do not want to obscure any relevant mitigations from the CSE’s view. With a false positive 
rate between 0 and 3% and specificity between 0.97 and 1.00, we are encouraged that the model 
will reliably eliminate instances that are not in the R class. Precision is lower than we desired 
and with this comes a few false positives. This shortfall can be mitigated in practice by 
providing for CSE screening of the recommended matches before they are committed to the 
knowledge base for reuse. The high precision (1.00), recall (>0.97), and specificity (1.00) of 
the NR class means the models will accurately eliminate most (>97%) of the NR instances 
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without any manual intervention, greatly reducing the CSE workload when compared to purely 
manual matching and leaving just a few false positives for the CSE to remediate. In a practical 
setting where the objective would be to build a reusable knowledge base of threat-mitigation 
mappings, this remediation activity would only have to be done for new matches. 
Objective: Process existing English language text documents where each 
separately describes either a threat or a mitigation. The CAPEC dataset and the additional 
example mitigations are English language documents. During the training and testing of each 
trial design, we demonstrated that the artifact accepts these English language text documents 
about threats and mitigations. 
Objective: Provide an automated method for recommending (matching) relevant 
mitigations when presented with a threat. During training and testing, we demonstrated that 
the artifact will label mitigations as relevant or not relevant to a given threat.  
Objective: Accommodate (be extensible to) new and evolving threats and 
mitigations. During testing we demonstrated that the artifact can accept new mitigations which 
it will label as relevant or not relevant on a “per threat” basis using a stored model trained from 
labeled data. The method can also accept new threats with the caveat that labeled data consisting 
of known relevant mitigations for the threat will have to be created so that a model can be 
trained. 
Objective: Provide utility to cybersecurity experts in mitigation selection. Merriam-
Webster equates utility with usefulness and “practical worth or applicability” (“Usefulness,” 
2019). Hevner et al. emphasize that “the artifact works and does what it is meant to 
do…achieving its goals.” (Gregor & Hevner, 2013) Finally, according to Raghavan et al. the 
“usefulness of a retrieval system is determined to a great extent by how closely it can 
characterize the dichotomy” of relevant vs non-relevant documents for its intended purpose 
(Raghavan et al., 1989). We use these definitions to assert a reasoned argument for utility of 
the artifact. We have shown that the artifact meets the objectives we set forth at the beginning 
of the research in 5 test cases, and especially that it matches most of the relevant mitigations 
for a given threat while ruling out at least 97% of the non-relevant mitigations. These results 
are favorable for utility, but we leave formal utility assessment to future work after the artifact 
has been operationalized into a system such as the one in Figure 6. 
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Objective: Be able to be used in a system that allows for reuse of the artifact and 
the matches produced by the artifact. The solution produces models that can be saved and 
reused. As described in the architecture section, if the artifact were to be operationalized in an 
architecture such as the one in Figure 6, the system could provide for models to be saved and 
reused to label new mitigations as they are encountered. The threat documents, mitigation 
documents, and labeled matches between the two could be persisted in a data store so that they 
can be reused to satisfy threat queries by the CSE. A user interface could allow the documents 
and matches to be viewed and utilized. 
Evaluation Summary. In Chapter 1 we motivated the problem of matching mitigations 
to cyber threats and in Chapter 3 we set forth objectives for a solution to that hard problem. We 
evaluated the artifact against those objectives and showed that it achieves its goals. Table 4 
summarizes the artifact evaluation based on the solution objectives stated in the Research 
Methodology section above. To show practical worth and applicability, we provided use cases 
and an architecture into which the artifact can be integrated for practical use by cybersecurity 
professionals engaged in cyber risk assessment. In particular, we produced a method for 
automatically matching mitigations to threats that is both extensible and reusable and that will 
match most of the relevant mitigations for a given threat while avoiding selection of non-
relevant mitigations. Moreover, five instantiations of the method accurately eliminated most 
(>97%) of the non-relevant mitigations without any manual intervention, leaving just a few 
false positives for the CSE to remediate manually. This robust discrimination of the R and NR 
classes aligns with Raghavan’s definition of usefulness for retrieval systems (Raghavan et al., 
1989). 
Table 4. Evaluation Results Based on Solution Objectives 
Objective Evaluation 
Process existing English language text 
documents where each separately 
describes either a threat or a mitigation 
Pass. By testing, we demonstrated that the 
artifact accepts English language text 
documents about threats and mitigations. 
Provide an automated method for 
recommending (matching) relevant 
mitigations when presented with a threat 
Pass. By testing, we demonstrated that the 
artifact proposes matching mitigations when a 
threat is given. 
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Objective Evaluation 
Match most of the relevant mitigations 
for a given threat while avoiding 
selection of non-relevant mitigations  
Pass. By evaluation of the models on test 
data, we demonstrated that the models can 
eliminate about 97% of non-relevant 
mitigations. Moreover, with recall at 1.00, it 
will not overlook relevant mitigations. 
Accommodate (be extensible to) new and 
evolving threats and mitigations 
Pass. The artifact can accept new mitigations 
which it will match to existing threats using a 
stored model trained from labeled data. The 
method can also accept new threats with the 
caveat that labeled data consisting of known 
relevant mitigations for the threat would have 
to be created so that a model can be trained.  
Provide utility to cybersecurity experts in 
mitigation selection 
Pass. By satisfying the preceding objectives, 
the artifact as instantiated provides practical 
value and to the CSE engaged in cyber risk 
assessment and meets the utility criteria for 
retrieval systems established by  (Raghavan et 
al., 1989). It has potential to reduce CSE 
workload by about 97% over purely manual 
matching. 
Be able to be used in a system that allows 
for reuse of the artifact and the matches 
produced by the artifact 
Pass. The artifact provides models that can be 
saved and reused to label additional 
mitigations at a later time. The artifact could 
be used in a system such as the one shown in 
Figure 6 where the threats, mitigations, and 
matches could be persisted in a data store and 
a user interface could be provided to allow 
this data to be viewed and reused. 
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Validity 
 
Figure 8. Validity 
Validity centers on interactions between the theoretical and observational research 
planes (Trochim & Donnelly, 2006) as illustrated in Figure 8. Constructs in the theoretical plane 
are intangible. In our research, the major constructs are cyber threats, mitigations, and a 
cognitive process that matches appropriate mitigations to threats. We operationalized these 
intangible ideas in the observational plane order to conduct the research. In our case, as shown 
in Figure 8, we operationalized threats and mitigations as textual documents describing 
instances of each of the corresponding constructs and we operationalized the cognitive 
matching process in our artifact. In the context of DSRM, Hevner et al. mention validity in the 
context of artifact evaluation stating that “validity means that the artifact works and does what 
it is meant to do; that it is dependable in operational terms in achieving its goals.” (Gregor & 
Hevner, 2013) The types of validity commonly discussed in scholarly research include, face 
validity, construct validity, internal validity, and external validity. In addition, Lukyanenko et 
al. recently put forth the concept of instantiation validity specifically for Design Science 
(Lukyanenko & Parsons, 2014). 
Face validity is a subjective assessment about whether the operationalization of the 
research constructs make sense when taken at face value. We argue for face validity of our 
operationalizations of the threat and mitigation constructs on the basis that the textual 
documents represent the traditional method by which such knowledge is codified. Likewise, 
the artifact parallels the cognitive matching process that the experts perform in their brains.   
Construct validity is “the degree to which inferences can legitimately be made from 
the operationalizations in a study to the theoretical constructs on which those 
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operationalizations were based” - in other words that the operationalizations are reasonable 
indicators of the underlying latent concepts (Trochim & Donnelly, 2006).  While there are tests 
for construct validity in quantitative research (e.g., convergent and discriminant validity), the 
picture is less clear for Design Science. One major threat to construct validity is failure to 
properly understand and explain the constructs before operationalizing them.  We have 
addressed this threat via our Literature Review of the pertinent content domains.  
Trochim defines internal validity as “the approximate truth about inferences regarding 
cause-effect or causal relationships” and furthermore asserts that “internal validity is only 
relevant in studies that try to establish a causal relationship.” (Trochim & Donnelly, 2006) Our 
research does not seek to establish a causal relationship; therefore, internal validity is mentioned 
here for completeness but is not pertinent to our research since we are not trying to establish 
causality. 
External validity “is the degree to which the conclusions in the study would hold for 
other persons in other places and at other times” also referred to as generalizability (Trochim 
& Donnelly, 2006).  The generalizability we seek is that our method applies to more threats 
than the 5 we tested here. We see initial indications of generality from similarities in the 5 test 
cases; however, the method must be applied to additional and more diverse sources of threats 
and mitigations before we can be sure.  
Instantiation validity is an assessment of how well an artifact created via Design 
Science Research instantiates constructs of the theory on which the artifact is based 
(Lukyanenko & Parsons, 2014). We have addressed and promoted instantiation validity in our 
research by appropriate alignment of the artifact with literature in the problem domains per the 
Literature Review and by developing the artifact using a rigorous approach as described in the 
Design and Development of the Artifact section.  
Communication 
Communication of research results to both practitioner and scholarly audiences is a key 
tenet of Design Science Research. Via a combination of UML drawings and prose, sufficiently 
detailed design documentation has been created to convey the construction details of the 
artifact. Per Hevner, this enables “practitioners to take advantage of the benefits” (Hevner & 
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March, 2004) while also promoting critical feedback and opportunities for extension by the 
research community. This dissertation satisfies the communication requirement of the DSRM. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this research, we set out to devise a method for matching mitigations to cyber threats 
expressed as English language text documents using machine learning and text retrieval 
techniques in support of cyber risk assessment. In the preceding chapters, we have discussed an 
iterative process framed within the Design Science Research Method where we evaluated and 
down-selected designs by comparing their respective measures of performance. We ultimately 
arrived at a matching method that achieves the stated objectives and we instantiated 5 examples 
as SVM “per threat” classifiers based on LSA features. We rigorously evaluated the 
instantiations in 5 test cases and were encouraged by the results. We illustrated the utility of the 
method by describing an architecture into which it can be integrated for practical use. Overall, 
we are encouraged by the results achieved thus far. 
Contributions 
Mitigation selection to remediate cyber threats has heretofore been primarily a manual 
process done by human experts using textual sources which are extensive and disparate. 
Reliance solely on human experts brings issues of scalability, consistency, and repeatability. 
The ongoing shortage of cybersecurity experts combined with a burgeoning cyber threat 
landscape compelled us to look for a way to improve this situation. 
This research contributes to theory by taking steps towards a novel machine learning 
method for automatically mapping mitigations to threats, both expressed as English language 
text, and demonstrating instantiations of the method. Moreover, the research fills a research gap 
in the cyber risk assessment literature by providing a semi-automated method to produce a 
starting list of possible mitigations for threats identified during risk assessment providing the 
data needed to flow into mitigation optimization techniques. The method is extensible to 
accommodate the continued evolution of both cyber threats and mitigations, an important 
consideration in light of the dynamic cyber landscape. We have also demonstrated one way to 
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improve the textual descriptions of threats and mitigations to better support automated 
matching.  
From a practical perspective, our method for matching mitigations to threats benefits all 
threat-informed cyber risk assessment approaches by providing a means to recommend relevant 
mitigations to remediate specific threats thereby aiding decision-making for IS stakeholders 
and cybersecurity experts. This is important because under-mitigating the actual threats 
provides a false sense of security while over-mitigating is costly and wasteful. When 
operationalized into a knowledge base, such as the one shown in Figure 6, where models and 
matches can be saved for reuse, the method may make mitigation selection more repeatable, 
facilitate knowledge reuse, save CSE time and labor, and extend the reach of cybersecurity 
experts who are currently in short supply. The list of mitigations applicable to each threat can 
serve as input into analyses of alternatives, enabling practitioners to leverage a large body of 
mitigation optimization research. Finally, the method can respond to the evolutionary nature of 
cyber threats and mitigations. Thus, it may improve overall security of cyber systems when 
used as part of a risk assessment and mitigation cycle such as the one shown in Figure 1 by 
making more frequent reassessments of cyber systems feasible. 
Lessons Learned from the Text 
In Chapter 4 Analysis of the Text, we identified that improving the mitigation texts to 
include an explanation of how each one addresses the threat would improve the match results 
by reducing the FNs. During the research, we noted domain-specific peculiarities in the 
documents. A number of issues are known to affect text-based processing in general, including 
synonymy, polysemy, misspellings, colloquialisms, and the use of acronyms and jargon. The 
cyber threat-mitigation matching problem suffered from all of these issues and, in addition, 
varying styles (e.g. prose versus bullets), varying degrees of brevity and verbosity, extraneous 
information (e.g. “this may be prohibitively expensive”), and expressions in the negative (i.e. 
what not to do). References to product names and technical standards sometimes served as 
short-hand, obscuring complex concepts. We also encountered considerable sameness in the 
language used to express different threats (e.g., SQL injection, email injection, script injection 
as well as some mitigations which apply to multiple threats (e.g., multifactor authentication, 
encryption, training). These conditions worked against discernment of relevance. Data 
51 
imbalance favoring the non-relevant class, limited matching mitigations per threat, and 
erroneous mappings presented tactical issues for classifier training.  
Future Work 
For this initial proof of concept research, we bounded the scope, providing ample 
opportunities for incremental improvements. The method we developed was instantiated and 
tested with English language documents. It would be interesting to extend it to other languages. 
Likewise, our instantiations were based on a narrow slice of cybersecurity documents. The 
method could be improved by exposure to more threat and mitigation sources. We made no 
effort to address redundant threats and mitigations in our corpus. In order to ingest documents 
from additional sources, the method should be preceded by an automated approach for dealing 
with duplication. In addition, analyses of the structure and semantics of threat and mitigation 
documents from various sources could lead to discovery of additional ways to improve the 
document content and by extension the matching method.  
We used supervised machine learning which required some pre-existing matches. This 
work could be extended by investigating semi-supervised learning classification techniques to 
build classifiers for new threats where labeled data does not yet exist. Moreover, it is possible 
that semi-supervised learning could also be used to improve the classifiers initially trained for 
existing threats by taking into account new matches that come about as new mitigation 
documents are added. 
We focused our research on defensive cybersecurity, identifying threats and seeking to 
determine relevant mitigations. It is possible that our method may be applicable or extensible 
to “white hat” offensive cybersecurity, such as to better understand attacker behavior or residual 
exposure. This perspective is characterized by identifying the mitigations present in a system 
and seeking to determine threats to counter them. Moreover, while we established a degree of 
utility for our method by demonstrating that the artifact solves the problem for 5 examples, 
survey research to investigate the perceived utility by actual CSEs would be beneficial. 
Finally, we identify several lofty goals for future extensions of this research. Improving 
the ways that threat and mitigation text is written, such as by addressing the limitations 
described in the Lessons Learned section, could improve the method. Furthermore, devising a 
robust ontology to capture the intricacy of threat/mitigation relationships would offer great 
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potential to improve the matches, helping to tease out complexities such as overlapping threats 
and one to many mitigation-threat mappings. This structure could be used as metadata to 
improve the matching models. In the long term, we envision the matcher as a component of an 
overarching architecture with a reusable, continually evolving, peer-reviewed knowledge base 
of threat-mitigation mappings with contributions coming from many sources, including threat 
frameworks, mitigation catalogs and vendor literature.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: DEFINITIONS OF CYBER TERMS 
In this appendix we define a few important cyber terms that recur in our dissertation.  
• We use the word cyber to denote associations with the information technology 
(IT) and information systems (IS) domains, including computers, computer 
networks, hardware, and software.  
• A cyber system is a system composed of IT/IS components, though it may also 
encompass non-cyber entities. Smart phones, automated teller machines, home 
automation systems, digital cameras, e-commerce platforms, and even the 
Internet are all examples of cyber systems of various sizes.  
• A cyber vulnerability is a known or unknown weakness in a cyber system. 
When we hear vulnerability, we most often think of software flaws, but cyber 
systems are also vulnerable to a number of other conditions, such as natural 
disasters and human error.  
• A cyber threat is any adverse event, regardless of intent, that disrupts a cyber 
system by activating a vulnerability. Common threats include errors, routine 
failures, natural disasters, and cyberattacks.  
• A cyberattack is a purposeful “attempt to damage, disrupt, or gain access to” a 
cyber system (Random House Inc., n.d.). Cyberattacks are often undertaken for 
nefarious purposes, though sometimes they may be pranks.  
• We use the term cyber effect to refer to the outcome after a cyber threat has 
been realized. Cyber effects are most commonly categorized in terms of loss of 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the cyber system or one of its parts.  
• Risk is a condition faced by an organization or entity. It encompasses the 
likelihood that a threat or adverse event will occur and the degree of damage or 
injury (also known in organizational contexts as mission impact) if the threat is 
realized.  
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• Cyber risk is the risk that an organization or entity faces due to its association 
with or reliance on cyber systems.   
• Mitigations represent tools or techniques that may counter or reduce the impact 
of cyber threats. In this paper, we consider the terms security controls and 
countermeasures to be synonymous with mitigations.  
• Risk assessment, according to Kaplan and Garrick, is an attempt “to envision 
how the future will turn out if we undertake a certain course of action (or 
inaction).”  (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981). In the case of cyber risk assessment, the 
objectives are to understand and prioritize identified cyber risks in order to 
understand the status quo and determine mitigating courses of action for high 
priority threats.  
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APPENDIX B. USE CASES  
The following use cases describe the main uses of a system such as the one illustrated 
in the drawing in Figure 6 and described in detail in Appendix C. Instantiations of the artifact 
of this research can be a key part of such a system that would allow a CSE to leverage the 
practical utility of the artifact. We refer to these instantiations as the Matcher. Each Matcher is 
a classifier for a particular threat that; it labels new potential mitigation document instances as 
relevant to the given threat. Each instantiation of the Matcher comes to exist by virtue of a 
model building process shown in Figure 4. In the notional architecture in Figure 6, we have 
allocated the process of creating new Matcher instantiations to the Preprocessor. Use cases 1 
and 2 relate to the Matcher (artifact). Use cases 3 through 7 relate to a system such as the one 
depicted in Figure 6 which would encompass the artifact and support practical usage of it.  
Use Case 1 Label potential mitigations relevant or not relevant to a specified 
threat 
Preconditions Unlabeled potential mitigation documents exist to be labeled. 
A model (classifier) and semantic space exist that can be used to 
determine the relevance of new mitigation documents for the 
specified threat, T. 
Success End Condition Unlabeled mitigations have been labeled relevant or not relevant 
to T. 
Actors Matcher 
Description 1. The Matcher pertinent to T ingests unlabeled potential 
mitigations. 
2. The Matcher transforms each mitigation, M, to the features of 
the semantic space. 
3. The Matcher applies the classifier to each transformed M. 
4. The Matcher outputs a relevant or non-relevant label and a 
confidence value for each M relative to T. 
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Use Case 2 Create a model for a new threat 
Preconditions A new threat, T, exists. 
At least n labeled mitigations relevant to T and at least m non-
relevant instances exist. (We arbitrarily used 20 for n and 200 for 
m.) 
Success End Condition A model (classifier) and semantic space exist that can be used to 
determine the relevance of new mitigation documents for the 
specified threat, T. 
Actors Preprocessor (Model Builder) 
Description 1. The Model Builder applies LSA to create a threat-specific 
semantic space from the provided labeled mitigations. 
2. The Model Builder saves the semantic space and the labels. 
3. The Model Builder uses T as a query against the semantic 
space returning mitigations in order from most to least relevant T.  
4. The Model Builder makes training data from the top 100 
mitigations and trains a classifier for T. 
Variations  
 
Use Case 3 Get a list of relevant mitigations for a given threat 
Preconditions Threat documents, mitigation documents, and mappings exist. 
A model exists that can determine the relevance of new 
mitigation documents for the given threat. 
Success End Condition A list of relevant mitigation documents for the given threat has 
been produced. 
Actors CSE, System 
Description 1. The CSE specifies an existing threat T and requests a list of 
relevant mitigations. 
2. If there are any unmapped mitigations in the system, the 
system first performs use case 4 to map them. 
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Use Case 3 Get a list of relevant mitigations for a given threat 
3. The system selects all mitigations labeled as R for threat T and 
returns the mitigation id, text, relevance indicator, relevance 
score, relevance source, verified indicator, and verified source. 
 
Use Case 4 Classify unmapped mitigations relative to a specified threat 
Preconditions Threat documents, mitigation documents, and mappings exist. 
Some new mitigations exist that are not yet mapped to any threat. 
A model exists that can predict the relevance of new mitigation 
documents for the given threat. 
Success End Condition New mitigations have been labeled with their relevance to the 
specified threat and marked as unverified. 
Actors System 
Description 1. The system loads the appropriate model to classify unlabeled 
mitigations for the specified threat, T. 
2. The system applies the threat-specific model to the unlabeled 
mitigations. 
3. The model predicts and outputs a label and a confidence value 
for each unlabeled mitigation to indicate its relevance or non-
relevance to T as described in use case 1. 
4. The system saves the threat-specific label determinations and 
relevance scores for each previously unlabeled mitigation, and 
marks the mapping as not verified. 
Variations Future: The system automatically marks new mappings verified 
when the confidence exceeds an established value C. 
 
Use Case 5 Add a new mitigation 
Preconditions The CSE has a new mitigation to add. 
The CSE has verified that the mitigation to be added is not 
already in the data store. 
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Use Case 5 Add a new mitigation 
Success End Condition The new mitigation has been added to the system and is ready to 
be labeled upon request. 
Actors CSE, System 
Description 1. The CSE requests to add the new mitigation to the data store. 
2. The system accepts and saves the new mitigation. 
Variations Future: The system automatically detects and prevents addition 
of duplicate mitigations. 
 
Use Case 6 Add a new threat 
Preconditions The CSE has a new threat to add. 
The CSE has at least n labeled mitigations relevant to the threat. 
The CSE has verified that the threat to be added is not already in 
the data store. 
Success End Condition The new threat, associated relevant mitigations, and verified 
mappings have been added to the system and a model has been 
created to handle the new threat. 
Actors CSE, System 
Description 1. The CSE requests to add the new threat, T, and associated 
mitigations to the system. 
2. The system accepts and saves the new threat, mitigations, and 
mappings for the relevant mitigations provided. The mappings 
are marked as verified. 
3. The system trains a new model for T per use case 2 using the 
provided labeled data and m negative instances drawn at random 
from the mappings already in the system. 
4. The system saves the model for future use. 
Variations Future: The system automatically detects and prevents addition 
of duplicate threats. 
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Use Case 7 Review/adjudicate matches 
Preconditions Mappings exists in the data store. 
Success End Condition The status has been changed for requested mappings. 
Actors CSE, System 
Description 1. The CSE requests to review unverified mappings, potentially 
specifying a confidence threshold. 
2. The system presents the new mappings to the CSE. 
3. For each mapping, 
a. The CSE approves, rejects, or skips. 
b. For approved or rejected mappings, the system saves 
the action. 
Variations Future: The system also allows the CSE to review existing 
mappings by specifying selection criteria. This could be used to 
correct errors that made it past the review process. 
 
  
72 
APPENDIX C. SOLUTION ARCHITECTURE 
Design and Architecture 
In order for the approach described in Chapter 4 to be useful to the cybersecurity expert 
in the context of cyber risk assessment, it must exist within a system with which the CSE can 
interact. This appendix describes the data model and an overall architecture for such a system. 
It has been designed modularly and using object-oriented principles so that any of the threat-
mitigation matching techniques investigated in this research could be incorporated as the 
Matcher. 
Data Model 
In this section, we present a logical view and description of the data types and 
relationships inherent in the artifact (Figure C.1). Note that, although this data model is based 
on the CAPEC data, it is not limited to CAPEC and is intended to be extensible to threat and 
mitigation documents from other sources.  
Catalog is the main object. It is a container for all the threats, mitigations, and associated 
mappings. Each Threat has a unique identifier (ID), a short title, and a description which can 
be verbose. A threat may have one of three levels of Abstraction (meta, standard, or detailed). 
We are focusing on CAPEC threats at the standard level of abstraction, because they have the 
best balance of specificity versus generality for our purposes. Meta threats represent groupings 
of similar threats, accessed via the ParentThreat property of a standard threat. Mitigations at the 
meta level are associated to the standard threats that are children of the meta threat. The 
DomainOfAttack (e.g. hardware, software, communications) and MechanismOfAttack (e.g. 
subvert access control) properties are also used to group related threats. Detailed threats are 
further refinements of standard threats, accessible via the ImmediateChildren property. 
KeyPhrases are significant words or phrases extracted from the threat title and description 
which succinctly represent the meaning of the threat. 
Each Mitigation has a unique identifier (ID), a short title, and a description, which can 
be verbose. The DomainOfAttack (e.g. hardware, software, communications) and 
MechanismOfAttack (e.g. subvert access control) properties are also used to group mitigations 
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that counter certain related categories of threats. KeyPhrases are significant words or phrases 
extracted from the mitigation title and description, which succinctly represent the meaning of 
the mitigation. 
 
 
Figure C.1. Overall Data Model 
A Mapping object represents a threat and mitigation pair, represented by a ThreatID 
and MitigationID, respectively. The IsRelevant and IsVerified properties are used to indicate 
the strength of the match. When IsRelevant is true, this means that the mitigation is a 
countermeasure for the threat, either because it was extracted based on a CAPEC threat-
mitigation mapping, or, if a new mitigation, as a result of a decision by the Matcher. When 
IsVerified is true, this means that the match has been independently verified. IsVerified and 
IsRelevant will always be true for matches extracted from CAPEC. For decisions made by the 
Matcher, IsRelevant will be true but IsVerified will initially be false until a SME concurs with 
the match. Mappings where IsRelevant and IsVerified are both true can be used as training data. 
Mappings where IsRelevant is false are not usually stored, except for diagnostic purposes. 
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Architecture Overview 
Figures C.2 and C.3 illustrate the architecture into which instantiations of the threat-
mitigation matcher can be inserted. Figure C.2 illustrates the preprocessor architecture. During 
Data Extraction, the CAPEC XML structure described in the Data Source and One-time Data 
Preparation section above is unpacked and transformed into the structure shown in Figure C.1 
and described above.  
 
Figure C.2. Preprocessor Architecture 
Preprocessor. The Preprocessor includes these functions: (a) convert the threat and 
mitigation text into threat documents, mitigation documents, and matches, (b) create indices to 
support the LSA representations of the documents, and (c) train model(s) as needed for the 
matcher. In (a) the threat and mitigation texts extracted from CAPEC are lower-cased, 
tokenized, and stemmed. In this architecture, a model will be trained for each threat then saved 
for reuse when matching is necessary. Over time, after substantial additional labeled data has 
been accumulated through the use of the system, it may make sense to train new models to take 
advantage of the new semantic knowledge provided. 
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Figure C.3. Matcher Architecture 
Matcher. The Matcher, shown in Figure C.3, is the main component of this research. It 
is executed on demand. To control the scope of the research, we assumed a fixed set of threat 
documents and a clear delineation between threats and mitigations. We decided to fix the pool 
of threats because our approach relies on the pre-existence of labeled data consisting of 
mitigations known to be relevant to the threat. We assumed that a document consists of either 
a threat or a mitigation but not both so that we did not have to invent a way to separate composite 
documents into the requisite parts. Our approach can accept new mitigations which it will match 
to existing threats. It can also accept new threats with the caveat that labeled data consisting of 
known relevant mitigations would have to be created so that a classifier can be trained. 
The Matcher uses the data output from the Preprocessor. It is implemented as described 
in Chapter 4 to select relevant mitigations for a given threat. Existing threats, mitigations, and 
matches extracted from CAPEC reside in their respective data stores as a result of data 
extraction and preprocessing. New mitigations are classified as relevant or not relevant to a 
selected threat by applying the models previously trained and stored. Each match is written to 
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the Matches data store as a row that references a threat, a matching mitigation, the rank of the 
match (if applicable), and a flag to designate matches considered to be ground truth, such as 
from training data or SME confirmation. Matches recorded from the labeled data will be flagged 
as verified. Matches generated by the Matcher will initially be flagged as unverified. 
Review. The review function allows a subject matter expert to examine new matches 
generated by the Matcher. The SME can confirm the match or indicate that the given threat-
mitigation pair is NR. It is not required that all generated matches must be reviewed. Initially 
that may be the practice, but as experience is gained in practical use, it may be that some new 
matches can be confirmed based on the model’s confidence in the match leaving only the least 
confident matches for SME review. Regardless of how review is handled, we think it is 
important to present the review status of each returned match to CSE who requests a list of 
mitigations for a given threat. This will help the CSE to compensate for errors in precision 
where a mitigation that is not relevant may be erroneously presented. 
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APPENDIX D. DESIGN TRIALS  
This appendix discusses details for each design iteration. At the outset, we had three 
design concepts for the threat-mitigation matcher artifact: classification, ranked retrieval, and a 
hybrid of the two. We explored a number of designs, including various classifiers, feature sets, 
and feature reduction techniques. 
Classification 
In this section we discuss the iterative process for applying classification in the design 
of our artifact. Following the medical SR literature discussed above in the Literature Review, 
we started with a single threat and some labeled mitigation data that contains instances that are 
relevant and not relevant to the threat. We designate this as the “per-threat” approach. In order 
for the “per threat” approach to solve the problem at hand, we would have to eventually train a 
classifier for each existing threat and likewise for new threats that come along; however, this 
does not seem like an unreasonable requirement. New threats do come along, but the library of 
known threats is relatively stable over time. In the ten months since we started this research, 
the CAPEC dataset has undergone two subsequent releases but only two new standard threats 
have been added to CAPEC. Tables D.1 and D.2 summarize several design iterations on the 
“per threat” approach, each of which is discussed in more detail following the tables. Later on, 
we discuss several trials where we experimented with a “one for all” approach. 
Table D.1. “Per Threat” Summary of Classification Iterations – Full Text 
# Trial Class P R FP F C I 
1 
 
Threat 49, one row for each 
mitigation  
Features:  
• Mitigation text,  
• R/NR indicator 
Filter: StringToWordVector 
• TFIDF 
• Lower case 
• Word tokenization 
(removes punctuation) 
R 0.25 0.11 0.01 0.15 1 8 
NR 0.99 0.99 0.89 0.99 601 3 
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# Trial Class P R FP F C I 
• Stemming 
• Eliminate stop words 
• Retain 1,000 words 
Classifier: Weka SMO 
2 
 
Same as trial 1 except  
Attribute selection: top 50 
attributes based on information 
gain 
R 0.50 0.11 0.00 0.18 1 8 
NR 0.99 0.99 0.89 0.99 603 1 
3 
 
Threat 49, one row for each 
mitigation 
Features: 
• Mitigation text  
• R/NR indicator 
Filter: StringToWordVector 
• TFIDF 
• Lower case 
• Word tokenization 
(removes punctuation) 
• Stemming 
• Eliminate stop words 
• Retain 1,679 words 
Classifier: Weka SMO 
R 0.92 0.48 0.00 0.63 12 13 
NR 0.98 0.99 0.52 0.99 611 1 
4 
 
Same as trial 5 plus attribute 
selection: top 200 attributes based 
on information gain 
R 0.83 0.39 0.002 0.53 5 8 
N 0.99 0.99 0.62 0.99 599 1 
 
Trial 1 
In the first trial, we made a training data set consisting of one row for each mitigation, 
where each row contained the mitigation text and an attribute to indicate if the mitigation is or 
is not relevant (R/NR) to threat 49. This data set was extremely unbalanced, containing 9 items 
in the R class and 604 (>99%) in the NR class. The input dataset was preprocessed in Weka by 
applying a StringToWordVector filter using TFIDF weighting, lower case, word tokenization, 
stemming, and stop word elimination, retaining 1,000 words. We trained a SMO model from 
the filtered data set. The only good thing to be said about this model is the false positive rate 
for the R class is low. Precision and recall for the R class (0.25/0.11) were worse than the flip 
of a coin; hence, unacceptable. 
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Trial 2 
In the second trial, we made a training data set and applied the filter as described in trial 
1, then selected the top 50 attributes using information gain. We trained a SMO model using 
the filtered and reduced data set.  This resulted in improved precision (0.50) for the R class and 
maintained the low false positive rate, but recall was still poor (0.11). 
As expected, the models in trials 1 and 2 were both very good at correctly classifying 
non-relevant instances due to the class imbalance in the data, but they were not good at correctly 
classifying relevant instances, likely for the same reason. It became apparent that it was 
necessary to do something about the class imbalance. In addition, note that this approach did 
not utilize any information from the threat; thus, such an approach may not generalize to other 
threats. This ultimately led us to try the keyword approach described later in trials 5 and 6. 
 
Trial 3 
 In trial 3, we followed the method described in trial 1, except we retained 1,679 words 
from the StringToWordVector filter. We selected the number 1,679 to facilitate comparison 
with the LSA ranked retrieval results in trials 9 and 10 discussed later (1,679 was the number 
of unique words identified during the LSA transformation). We did not perform any attribute 
reduction. We trained a SMO model from the filtered data set, achieving precision of 0.92, 
recall of 0.48, and minimal false positives for the R class. This is an improvement over the prior 
trials and suggests that retaining more words is better. Precision and recall for the NR class 
were 0.98 and 0.99, respectively. As mentioned previously, the dataset is highly imbalanced in 
favor of the NR class but we are primarily interested in the R class. For the R class, precision 
in this trial was good (0.92), but recall was not good enough. There are only a small number of 
relevant mitigation documents for a given threat and at 50% recall, we would be failing to 
recommend over half of them. 
 
Trial 4 
In trial 4, we made a training dataset similar to the one in trial 3, but used attribute 
selection to choose the top 200 attributes based on information gain. We trained a SMO model 
from the filtered and reduced data set, achieving precision and recall (0.83/0.39) for the R class 
and (0.99/0.99) for the majority NR class. Recall and precision here were worse than trial 3, 
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suggesting that the additional words do add some information to the model, which is lost during 
the information gain reduction. 
Table D.2. “Per Threat” Summary of Classification Iterations – Keywords 
# Trial Class P R FP F C I 
5 
 
Threat 49, one row for each 
mitigation, 2/3 undersampling of the 
NR class 
Features:  
• Presence/absence of threat 
keywords (TextRank + 
synonyms) in mitigation text 
• R/NR indicator 
Filter: 
• Lower case 
• Eliminate stop words and 
punctuation 
Classifier: Weka SMO 
R 0.82 0.67 0.00 0.74 14 3 
NR 0.97 0.99 0.33 0.98 207 7 
6 
 
Threat 49, one row for each 
mitigation, 2/3 undersampling of the 
NR class instances and 100% 
SMOTE oversampling of the R class 
Features:  
• Presence/absence of threat 
keywords in mitigation text  
• R/NR indicator 
Filter: 
• Lower case 
• Eliminate stop words and 
punctuation 
Classifier: Weka SMO 
R 0.97 0.74 0.00 0.84 31 1 
NR 0.95 1.00 0.24 0.97 211 11 
 
Trial 5 
An inspection of the mitigation text for the 9 relevant examples in trial 2 revealed that 
those which were correctly classified have in common some key words from threat 49 
suggesting keywords/phrases as a possible way to introduce information from the threat text 
into the approach, while also potentially improving the classification results. Table D.3 shows 
the keywords/phrases automatically extracted by TextRank for threat 49 and its associated 
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mitigations. Some of these keywords were rather rough, so we decided to clean them up 
manually. The improved keywords are also shown in the table. While it would be nice in the 
long run (assuming an approach based on keywords bears fruit) to automate the keyword/phrase 
extraction, it will suffice to prove the concept if we use expert-assigned keywords. 
Table D.3. Keywords for Threat 49 
Text Rank Improved 
attack 
adequate password policy 
brute force attack 
dictionary attacks 
effective e 
feasible 
computationally 
maximum length 
password 
password brute 
possible passwords 
possible value 
proper enforcement 
mechanism 
pure brute force attack 
rainbow tables 
strong passwords 
weak other password 
password policy 
password 
policy 
brute force 
brute 
force 
combination 
trial and error 
trial 
length 
throttle 
limit 
strong password 
strong 
weak password 
weak 
user 
 
Next, we investigated techniques to address the class imbalance in the data (Cohen et 
al., 2006; Miwa et al., 2014; Timsina et al., 2016). The most obvious solution was to add more 
relevant mitigations, so we extracted about a dozen additional documents relevant to threat 49 
from the internet and added them to the data. In addition, we decided to try undersampling of 
the dominant (NR) class. The danger of undersampling is information loss; however, due to the 
extreme imbalance, it seemed a risk worth taking. We also decided to try oversampling of the 
minority (R) class. Oversampling can result in overfitting, but this likewise seemed like a risk 
worth taking in the given situation.  
In trial 5, we created a dataset with one entry for each mitigation in the corpus, including 
12 additional mitigations relevant to threat 49 drawn from the Internet. In this dataset, the 
features consisted of threat 49 keyword counts plus the R/NR indicator. To reduce class 
imbalance, we under-sampled by randomly dropping 2/3 of the NR instances, then we trained 
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a SMO model. The training set contained about 225 instances (slight variances due to random 
sampling) with about 9% relevant. Although still notable, the class imbalance was not as severe 
as was the original dataset. In this trial, the SMO model showed improved precision (0.82) and 
recall (0.67) of the R class, low false positives (0.00), and no appreciable impact to the precision 
and recall of the NR class. We used several different methods for determining the keyword 
counts, including a simple count of the times a keyword appeared in the document (TF), TFIDF, 
TF divided by the total number of words in the document, and 0 or 1 to indicate the keyword is 
present or absent in the document. Of these, the presence/absence approach yielded the best 
results, which are reported here. 
 
Trial 6 
To further improve balance, in trial 6 we followed a process similar to trial 5, but with 
100% Synthetic Minority Oversampling Technique (SMOTE) (He & Garcia, 2009; Liu et al., 
2016) based on 5 nearest neighbors to double the number of instances of the R class.  The 
SMOTE technique creates new instances of the minority class by drawing features from the K 
(e.g. 5) nearest minority instances based on Euclidean distance in the feature space. We trained 
a SMO model for threat 49. The training set contained about 225 instances, 18% relevant. 
Although still significant, the class imbalance was less pronounced than the prior trial. With 
combined undersampling of the NR class and oversampling of the R class, the SMO model 
achieved precision of 0.97 and recall of 0.74 for the R class with minimal false positives and 
no appreciable impact to the precision and recall of the NR class. The undersampling of the NR 
class and oversampling of the R class showed some modest improvement in results over prior 
trials, especially in regards to precision. However, a recall of 0.74 means we would fail to 
recommend about a quarter of the available mitigations for threat 49.  
We were curious about the potential impact of additional under- and oversampling, so 
we experimented with 3/4 undersampling of the NR class, and 200% oversampling of the R 
class for threat 49. When comparing 3/4 undersampling versus 2/3 undersampling of the NR 
class for the same oversampling percentage (100%) of the R class, the precision, recall, and F-
measure for 2/3 undersampling was better. When we increased oversampling of the NR class 
to 200%, recall of the R class seemed to improve overall but with a small toll on precision. In 
the 200% oversampling case, the model failed to properly classify test samples. These results 
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suggest that 3/4 NR undersampling was too much and, when combined with 200% R 
oversampling, the model was becoming overfit to the training data. 
Ranked Retrieval 
As a possible alternative to classification, in the spirit of iterative design, we 
investigated two ranked retrieval (i.e. search engine) approaches to matching relevant 
mitigations for a given threat similar to (Foltz, 1990; Goldrich et al., 2014; Swanson & 
Smalheiser, 1997). In trials 7 and 8, we investigated ranking based on a combination of the 
Boolean and Vector Space models as implemented in Apache Lucene (Apache Foundation, 
2013). In trials 9 and 10, we investigated ranking based on Latent Semantic Analysis as 
implemented in Gensim  (Rehurek, 2018). The results are summarized in Table D.4 with details 
provided after the table. 
Table D.4. “Per Threat” Summary of Ranked Retrieval Iterations 
# Trial Class P@25 R FP F C I 
7 Threat 49, one row for each 
mitigation 
Features: 
• Full mitigation text 
• Tokenized, stop words 
removed, TFIDF 
Apache Lucene with Standard 
analyzer similarity to threat 
keywords (top 25) 
R 0.48 0.48   12 13 
8  Threat 49, one row for each 
mitigation 
Features: 
• Full mitigation text 
• Tokenized, stop words 
removed, TFIDF, 
stemmed 
Apache Lucene with Custom 
analyzer similarity to threat 
keywords (top 25) 
R 0.60 0.60   15 10 
9 Threat 49, one row for each 
mitigation  
Features: 
R 
 
0.92 0.92   23 2 
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# Trial Class P@25 R FP F C I 
• Full mitigation text 
LSA similarity to full threat text 
(top 25) 
10 Threat 49, one row for each 
mitigation  
Features: 
• Full mitigation text 
LSA similarity to threat name 
(top 25) 
R 0.84 0.84   21 4 
 
Trials 7 and 8 
For trials 7 and 8, we used Apache Lucene, which implements the Vector Space models. 
Retrieval in Lucene is a two-stage process. First, an index of the document corpus is created; 
then queries can be run against the index. A Lucene index is an inverted index of terms in 
documents, where each term consists of a field name and corresponding field token(s). The 
tokens are, in essence, values of the fields input into the indexing process, except in the case of 
text inputs they may have been tokenized, lower-cased, stemmed, etc. depending on the Lucene 
Analyzer chosen. The inverted index supports scoring of results during the search stage such 
that documents which contain more of the search terms will score higher and thus will be 
deemed more relevant. Items designated as “TextField” are tokenized by the Analyzer which 
those designated as “StringField” are captured literally in the index. We indexed the fields from 
each mitigation as shown in Table D.5. Meanings of the fields are described in the Data Source 
and One-time Data Preparation section above. We elected not to tokenize the Id and Threat Ids 
because we included them in the index for diagnostic purposes only (not for searching) and we 
wanted to preserve their human-readability. We elected not to tokenize the Domain of Attack 
and Mechanism of Attack because these are metadata which we also wanted to preserve intact. 
We allowed the remaining fields to be tokenized to improve matching during the search stage.  
Table D.5. Fields Indexed for Ranked Retrieval 
Field Type Index Store Rationale 
Name TextField Yes Yes Threat matching 
Description TextField Yes No Threat matching 
Keywords TextField Yes Yes Threat matching 
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Field Type Index Store Rationale 
Id StringField Yes Yes Diagnostic 
Domain of Attack StringField Yes Yes Threat matching 
Mechanism of Attack StringField Yes Yes Threat matching 
Threat Ids Mitigated StringField Yes Yes Diagnostic 
 
We experimented with two different analyzers. The StandardAnalyzer is the most 
commonly used Lucene analyzer. It tokenizes text based on white space, removes stop words, 
and lower cases the text. We also tried a CustomAnalyzer, in which we added stemming to the 
other options. We created the search query for each threat by or-ing its respective threat 
keywords and executed the search over the mitigation text. The query returned the mitigations 
in rank order by similarity. In a perfect world, the known relevant mitigations should be top-
ranked, so we established a relevant/not relevant cutoff at the top 25 for purposes of measuring 
the efficacy of this approach. At this cut-off, only about half the relevant mitigations were 
returned, and precision and recall were about equivalent to a coin flip. If we were to use this 
approach to recommend mitigations, we would not want the cut-off to be much larger than the 
expected number of relevant results as this would lead to recommending mitigations that are 
not actually relevant to the threat. 
 
Trials 9 and 10 
 As mentioned in the Literature Review section, Latent Semantic Analysis has been 
shown to improve retrieval of relevant documents from a corpus when compared to keyword 
search because LSA addresses the issue of synonymy inherent in natural language. In trials 9 
and 10 we experimented with a ranking approach using LSA. This is also a two-stage process 
where the corpus must be indexed (i.e. transformed to a semantic space) before it can be queried. 
We started with a comma-separated-values (CSV) file containing one row for each mitigation, 
containing the mitigation id, text, and R/NR indicator designating the mitigation’s relevance to 
threat 49. The mitigation text was used to build the semantic space and the other fields were 
used for evaluation and diagnostic purposes. 
For each mitigation text, stop words were removed, then the text was tokenized, lower-
cased, and stemmed. Using Gensim, Bag of words (BOW) and TFIDF representations of the 
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corpus were computed and then TFIDF representation was transformed to a semantic space or 
Latent Semantic Index (LSI) retaining 200 topics. This is slightly higher than the number of 
standard threats in CAPEC and fits with optimal LSI dimensionality findings in (Bradford, 
2008). Bradford observed favorable results when the number of topics was between 200 and 
500 for a corpus with millions of documents. We selected the low end of Bradford’s range 
because our corpus is much smaller than his. The LSI representation was saved for future use 
in similarity queries. The BOW corpus had 637 documents and 1679 features. 
We experimented with two approaches for constructing the threat query. In trial 9, we 
used the full text of the threat document (tokenized, stemmed, lower-cased, and transformed to 
the semantic space) as the query and in trial 10 we used the threat name (similarly transformed) 
as the query. We established the cut-off at the top 25. In trial 9 (precision=0.92, recall=0.92), 
22 of the known mitigations earned similarity scores in the top 25, while the others scored 26th, 
38th, 40th, and 370th. In trial 10 (precision=0.84, recall=0.84), 21 of the known mitigations 
ranked in the top 25 and all ranked in the top 82. Trial 9, similarity to full threat text, 
outperformed trial 10, similarity to threat name. This suggests that a query with more semantic 
context (i.e. more words) is better. 
In terms of precision and recall, the LSA retrieval results are better than the SMO 
models trained based on words in the mitigation text (trials 1 - 4) but slightly worse than the 
SMO models trained to emphasize threat keywords in the mitigation text (trials 5 and 6). The 
LSA results are better than the keyword search trials (7 and 8), which is not surprising given 
LSA’s reputation for improved performance versus keyword search (Deerwester et al., 1990).  
Hybrid 
Drawing from (Manning et al., 2009), (Nakamoto, 2011), and (Gee, 2003), we 
experimented with several hybrid approaches that combine ranked retrieval and classification 
techniques. For these trials we used LSA features in conjunction with the SVM classifier. As 
mentioned previously, we selected this classifier because support vector machines have been 
shown to perform favorably for text classification, especially when the number of positive 
instances per category is small (Platt, 1998). We decided to continue to use SVM in the hybrid 
trials to facilitate apples-to-apples comparisons with the prior results. The results of these trials 
are presented in Table D-6 with details following the table. 
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Table D-6. “Per Threat” Summary of Hybrid Iterations 
# Trial Class P R FP F C I 
11 
 
Threat 49, one row for each 
mitigation  
Features: 
• LSA transform of mitigation 
text (200 features)  
• R/NR indicator 
Classifier: Weka SMO 
R 1.00 0.72 0.00 0.76 18 7 
NR 0.99 1.00 0.28 0.99 612 0 
12 
 
Threat 49, one row for each 
mitigation, drop rows not in top 100 
similarity scores vs full threat text  
Features: 
• LSA transform of mitigation 
text (200 features)  
• R/NR indicator 
 (*)The number incorrect does not 
include the one known relevant 
mitigation that was ranked outside 
the top 100. 
Classifier: Weka SMO 
R 0.95 0.75 0.01 0.84 18 6(*) 
NR 0.93 0.99 0.25 0.96 75 1 
13 
 
Same as trial 12 except drop rows 
not in top 100 similarity scores vs 
threat name (all R samples were in 
the top 100) 
R 0.95 0.76 0.01 0.84 19 6 
NR 0.93 0.99 0.24 0.96 74 1 
14 
 
Classifier based on (Gee, 2003) 
using LSA nearest neighbor and/or 
majority on mitigation text 
R 0.63 0.83 0.03 0.71 5 1 
NR 0.99 0.97 0.17 0.98 92 1 
(+2 
tie) 
 
Trials 11 
 In trial 11, we extracted the LSA-transformed representation of each mitigation (200 
features) from the semantic space and made a CSV consisting of these features plus the R/NR 
indicator. We trained a SMO model using this data set. The model in trial 11 achieves very high 
precision (1.0) and minimal false positives but only mediocre recall (0.72). This suggests that, 
although this approach would not recommend any errant mitigations, it would fail to 
recommend nearly 40% of the relevant mitigations.  
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Trials 12 - 13 
Recalling that the dataset is extremely imbalanced in favor of the NR class and that we 
saw improvement in the results above (trials 5 and 6) when we took steps to achieve better 
balance in the training data, we decided, in trials 12 - 13, to utilize the LSA similarity scores as 
a means to balance the training data. That is, we cut the training data off after the top 100 entries 
based on similarity to the threat text. We intuited that this approach will be better than simply 
undersampling at random and over-sampling with SMOTE for the following reasons. 
Undersampling at random could drop relevant entries of which we already have too few. 
Oversampling with SMOTE adds new instances to the corpus, but no new knowledge. Because 
the similarity score imparts some knowledge about the semantics of the entries, keeping the 
most similar entries will keep most of the relevant entries and in addition the non-relevant 
entries that are most difficult to discriminate.  
In trial 12, we used similarity scores resulting from comparing the full threat test against 
the mitigations in the semantic space up to the cut-off. In trial 13, we used similarity scores 
resulting from comparing the threat name against the mitigations up to the cut-off.  In trials 12 
and 13, we trained the models using only the 200 LSA features and the R/NR indicator. Trial 
12 (similarity based on full threat text) and 13 (similarity based on threat name) produced 
similar balance of precision and recall, while keeping false positives low (Trial 12: P=0.95, 
R=0.75, FP=0.01; Trial 13: P=0.95, R=0.76, FP=0.01), but it is worth noting that the recall 
number is somewhat optimistic because it does not account for one relevant mitigation that was 
dropped from the training set because it ranked lower than the cut-off.  We cannot afford to 
omit up to 25% of the relevant mitigations. 
 
Trial 14 
In trial 14 we developed a method for classifying mitigations relevant/not-relevant to a 
given threat  inspired by Gee (Gee, 2003) and Foltz (Foltz, 1990). First, LSA was utilized to 
create a semantic space for a training set consisting of 80% of the existing labeled mitigation 
documents and an external index was constructed to maintain the known relevance status of the 
mitigation with regard to the threat. When a new mitigation document was presented, it was 
used as a query against the semantic space, returning a ranked list of other mitigation documents 
similar to the query from most similar to least. The trial 14 classifier classifies the new 
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document in three stages. First, it is classified according to the class of its nearest neighbor in 
the space (i.e. the existing mitigation document whose similarity score is highest). Next, the 
new mitigation document is classified according to class of the majority of all results in the 
ranked list truncated at an arbitrary cut-off N. Finally, if the majority and nearest neighbor 
stages agree, the new mitigation document is deemed to be of the nearest neighbor’s class. If 
the majority and nearest neighbor stages do not agree, the dispute is settled by the third stage 
which attempts to detect the skew of the new document towards one class or the other. We 
implemented the first 2 stages using an arbitrary cut-off of top 5, but for the tie-breaker we took 
a default where tie equates to an incorrect classification (i.e. for the R class, resulting prediction 
is NR; for the NR class, resulting prediction is R). We intended to go back and implement a 
more robust tie-breaker if observations revealed an approach that would be beneficial. 
In trial 14, there were 546 mitigations in the training set and 101 (6 relevant and 95 not 
relevant to threat 49) in the testing set. On the test data, this method yielded precision of 0.63 
and recall of 0.83 with 3% false positives on the R class and 0.99/0.97/17% for the NR class. 
Two ties were encountered in the NR class indicating the need to consider a better tie-breaker 
before this method could to be viable. 
A possible stage 3 algorithm, based on (Gee, 2003) is as follows for arbitrary A, B, and 
C which Gee set to 0.7, 0.7, and 0.65 respectively: 
• If the average of the majority scores > A and the nearest neighbor score < B, use the 
majority class 
• If the average of the majority scores < B and the nearest neighbor score > A use the 
nearest neighbor class 
• If the nearest neighbor score > C use the nearest neighbor class 
• If the average of the majority scores > C use the majority class 
• If still not determined, result = incorrect classification 
Analysis of Text 
 Success in classifying textual data is heavily influenced by the characteristics of the text 
itself. Having experimented with a few variations, it made sense to pause and look closely at 
the text of threat 49 for insights on the matching successes and failures. In the training corpus, 
there are 25 known relevant mitigations. Using diagnostic tools, we identified 6 mitigations that 
were commonly misclassified in the trials. One thing the false negative instances had in 
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common is that they lack any text that helps the reader understand how the mitigation addresses 
the threat. The false positives fell into two categories: (a) some dealt with password 
vulnerabilities but not specifically password brute force guessing and (b) others dealt with brute 
force guessing but not of passwords. We hypothesized that improving the mitigation texts to 
include an explanation of how each one addresses the threat would improve the match results 
by reducing the FNs. In some applications of text mining, the text “is what it is” and we have 
to use what we find (e.g. ratings, surveys, news articles). For threat-mitigation matching, we 
have influence over the problem space and thus we do have the luxury of recommending 
improvements to the threat and mitigation documents to better support automated matching in 
the future. With that in mind, we augmented the text of the FPs and FNs then reran selected 
trials as shown in Table D-7 and described below the table. A side-by-side comparison of the 
results for the R class on the original and improved mitigation text for the best trials is provided 
in Table D-8. 
Table D-7. “Per Threat” Summary (Improved Mitigation Text) 
# Trial Class P R FP F C I 
15 
 
Threat 49, one row for each 
mitigation, enhanced mitigation text 
with vector space representation and 
TFIDF 
(comparable to trial 3) 
R 1.00 0.56 0.00 0.72 14 11 
NR 0.98 1.00 0.44 0.99 612 0 
16 
 
Same as trial 15 plus attribute 
selection: top 200 attributes based on 
information gain  
(comparable to trial 4) 
R 1.00 0.56 0.00 0.72 14 11 
NR 0.98 1.00 0.44 0.99 612 0 
17 
 
Threat 49, one row for each 
mitigation, full corpus, 200 LSA 
features from enhanced mitigation 
text 
(comparable to trial 11) 
R 0.95 0.80 0.00 0.87 20 5 
NR 0.99 0.99 0.20 0.99 611 1 
 
18 
 
Threat 49, one row for each 
mitigation, 200 LSA features from 
enhanced mitigation text, drop rows 
not in top 100 (comparable to trial 
12), Weka SMO 
R 0.95 0.80 0.01 0.87 20 5 
NR 0.94 0.99 0.20 0.96 74 1 
18b 
 
Same as trial 18 but retain top 200 
rows 
R 1.00 0.70 0.00 0.82 14 6 
NR 0.97 1.00 0.30 0.98 180 0 
18c 
 
Same as trial 18 but retain top 300 
rows 
R 0.94 0.64 0.00 0.76 16 9 
NR 0.97 0.99 0.36 0.98 274 1 
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# Trial Class P R FP F C I 
18d 
 
Same as trial 18 except using scikit-
learn SVM.SVC 
R 0.96 0.92 0.01 0.94 23 2 
NR 0.97 0.99 0.08 0.98 74 1 
19 
 
Classifier based on (Gee, 2003) using 
LSA nearest neighbor and/or 
majority on enhanced mitigation text  
(comparable to trial 14) 
R 0.75 1.00 0.01 0.86 6 0 
NR 1.00 0.99 0.00 0.99 200 2 
 
Trials 15 - 16 
We ran trials 15 and 16 to see if the improved mitigation text yielded improved results when 
classifying the text using the Vector Space Model and TFIDF weights without and with 
information gain attribute selection. These compare with trials 3 and 4 in Table 3.  We saw 
improvement in recall and precision and reduction in both false negatives and false positives, 
but recall was still too low for our purposes. 
 
Trials 17 - 18 
We ran trials 17 - 18 on the improved text because the corresponding trials in Table 4 showed 
the best results on the original text. In trial 17, we trained the classifier on the LSA features 
using the full corpus. In trial 18, we used the top 100 mitigations ranked by similarity to the 
threat as the training corpus. Trial 17 showed modest improvement in recall but a slight decline 
in precision over a similar trial (11) and no false positives. Trial 18 showed stable precision and 
false positive rate and modest improvement in recall over a similar trial (12). This model has 
good precision and an acceptably low FP rate on the R class, but the recall of 0.80 was 
concerning because it represents a significant number of relevant mitigations that would not be 
recommended. We ran alternate versions of trial 18 where we retained the 200 (18b) and 300 
(18c) top-ranked mitigations, but the recall of the R class declined as we increased the training 
dataset, likely because the additional samples were mainly NR samples resulting in increased 
class imbalance. An alternate version (18d) using scikit-learn SVM.SVC had a modest 
improvement in precision over the Weka SMO version (18) and a notable improvement in 
recall. 
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Trial 19 
In trial 19, overall precision and recall for the R class was 0.75/1.0 with 1% FP and for the NR 
class was 1.0/0.99 with no false positives. For the NR class, in 200 instances, the predicted and 
actual labels agreed, 2 resulted in a tie (reaffirming the need to more fully investigate a tie-
breaker) where nearest neighbor class predicted NR but top 5 majority predicted R, and none 
were incorrectly classified. The nearest neighbor similarity range for the R class was 0.47 to 
0.92 and for the NR class was 0.36 to 1. The majority mean similarity range for the R class was 
0.45 to 0.65 and for the NR class was 0.31 to 0.89. With such large ranges, tie-breaker cut-offs 
similar to those in Gee’s algorithm were not obvious. The majority and nearest neighbor 
similarities for the two ties, both of the NR class, were 0.41 and 0.38 respectively. 
Table D-8. “Per Threat” Results Before and After Text Improvement 
# Trial Class P R FP F C I 
3 Threat 49, one row for each 
mitigation, mitigation text with 
vector space representation and 
TFIDF 
R 0.92 0.48 0.00 0.63 12 13 
15 R 1.00 0.56 0.00 0.72 14 11 
         
4 Same as trial 3/15 plus attribute 
selection: top 200 attributes based 
on information gain 
R 0.83 0.39 0.002 0.53 5 8 
16 R 1.00 0.56 0.00 0.72 14 11 
         
6 Threat 49, one row for each 
mitigation, 2/3 undersampling of 
the NR class instances and 100% 
SMOTE oversampling of the R 
class, presence/absence of threat 
keywords in mitigation text 
(Note: No after improvement trial) 
R 0.97 0.74 0.00 0.84 31 1 
  
         
11 Threat 49, one row for each 
mitigation, full corpus with 200 
LSA features 
R 1.00 0.72 0.00 0.76 18 7 
17 R 0.95 0.80 0.00 0.87 20 5 
         
12 Threat 49, one row for each 
mitigation, drop rows not in top 
100, 200 LSA features  
R 0.95 0.75 0.01 0.84 18 6 + 
1(*) 
18d R 0.96 0.92 0.01 0.94 23 2 
         
14 Ensemble classifier based on (Gee, 
2003) 
R 0.63 0.83 0.03 0.71 5 1 
19 R 0.75 1.00 0.01 0.86 6 0 
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Table D-8 provides a comparison of results for “per threat” matching approaches for 
selected trials before and after improvement of the mitigation text. Per common practice, we 
used the precision, recall, and false positive rates of the R class (based on cross-validation 
statistics generated during training) to compare the models. From these results, we decided to 
advance the designs in trials 12/18d and 14/19. These have the best balance of precision and 
recall on cross-validated training data. We left the designs in trials 3/15, 4/16, and 11/17 behind 
due to unacceptably low recall. We shelved the design in trial 6 for two reasons. First, its recall 
lags behind the other retained designs. Second, the automated keyword/phrase extraction was 
only moderately successful, leaving us with required manual SME intervention to perfect the 
keywords. Note also that our intuition that improving the mitigation text to describe how the 
mitigation addresses the threat would yield better matching results is buoyed by these initial 
results, especially in regards to precision. 
Extensibility to Other Threats 
Having seen promising results from some “per threat” designs, we wanted to know if 
these results would extend to other CAPEC standard threats. Tables D-9, D-10, D-11, and D-
12 show results for threats 268, 593, 66, and 134 respectively for the designs in trials 13/14 for 
the unimproved text and 18d/19 for the improved text.  
Table D-9. “Per Threat” Comparison for Threat 268 
# Trial Class P R FP F C I 
 Unimproved Text        
13 One row for each mitigation, drop 
rows not in top 100, 200 LSA 
features (*) The number incorrect 
does not include the one known 
relevant mitigation that was ranked 
outside the top 100 
R 1.00 0.90 0.00 0.95 18 2+ 
1(*) 
NR 0.98 1.00 0.00 0.99 80 0 
14 Ensemble classifier based on (Gee, 
2003) 
R 0.66 0.50 0.02 0.57 2 2 
NR 0.96 0.98 0.50 0.97 49 1 
 Improved Text        
18d One row for each mitigation, 200 
LSA features, drop rows not in top 
100 
R 0.95 0.95 0.01 0.95 20 1 
NR 0.99 0.99 0.05 0.99 78 1 
19 Ensemble classifier based on (Gee, 
2003) 
R 0.80 1.00 0.02 0.89 4 0 
NR 1.00 0.98 0.00 0.99 49 1 
94 
 
 
Table D-10. “Per Threat” Comparison for Threat 593 
# Trial Class P R FP F C I 
 Unimproved Text        
13 One row for each mitigation, 200 
LSA features, drop rows not in top 
100 
R 0.73 0.69 0.12 0.71 22 10+ 
4(*) 
NR 0.86 0.88 0.31 0.87 60 8 
14 Ensemble classifier based on (Gee, 
2003)  
R 0.30 0.75 0.04 0.75 3 1 
NR 0.99 0.96 0.25 0.99 167 1 
(+6 
tie) 
 Improved Text        
18d One row for each mitigation, 200 
LSA features, drop rows not in top 
100 
R 0.94 0.86 0.03 0.90 30 5+ 
1(*) 
NR 0.93 0.97 0.14 0.95 63 2 
19 Ensemble classifier based on (Gee, 
2003)  
R 0.45 1.00 0.03 0.91 5 0 
NR 1.00 0.97 0.00 0.99 167 1 
(+5 
tie) 
 
Table D-11. “Per Threat” Comparison for Threat 66 
# Trial Class P R FP F C I 
 Unimproved Text        
13 One row for each mitigation, 200 
LSA features, drop rows not in top 
100 
R 0.50 0.33 0.06 0.40 5 10+ 
5(*) 
NR 0.89 0.94 0.67 0.91 80 5 
14 Ensemble classifier based on 
(Gee, 2003) 
R 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0 3 (+1 
tie) 
NR 0.96 0.97 1.00 0.98 96 1 (+2 
tie) 
 Improved Text        
18d One row for each mitigation, 200 
LSA features, drop rows not in top 
100 
R 0.86 0.90 0.04 0.88 18 2 
NR 0.97 0.96 0.10 0.97 77 3 
19 Ensemble classifier based on 
(Gee, 2003) 
R 0.80 1.00 0.01 1.00 4 0 
NR 1.00 0.99 0.00 1.00 98 (+1 
tie) 
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Table D-12. “Per Threat” Comparison for Threat 134 
# Trial Class P R FP F C I 
 Unimproved Text        
13 One row for each mitigation, 200 
LSA features, drop rows not in top 
100 
R 0.86 0.75 0.01 0.80 6 2 
NR 0.98 0.99 0.25 0.98 91 1 
14 Ensemble classifier based on (Gee, 
2003) 
R 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 1 
(+1 
tie) 
NR 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 111 0 
 Improved Text        
18d One row for each mitigation, 200 
LSA features, drop rows not in top 
100 
R 1.00 0.88 0.00 0.93 7 1 
NR 0.99 1.00 0.13 0.99 92 0 
19 Ensemble classifier based on (Gee, 
2003) 
R 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 1 0 
(+1 
tie) 
NR 0.99 1.00 0.50 1.00 111 0 
 
Table D-13 shows a summary of the cross-validation statistics for the R class for models 
trained for threats 49, 66, 134, 268, and 593. Note that precision, recall, and false positive rates 
are better for the improved text when compared to models trained with the unimproved text. Of 
the two, the SVM classifier based on LSA features and top 100 most similar documents (Trial 
18d) has the best precision, recall, and false positive rate when compared to the ensemble 
classifier (19).  
Table D-13. “Per Threat” Models Summary for R Class 
# Trial 
 
Threat P  
(Mean) 
R 
(Mean) 
FP 
(Mean) 
#C #I 
 Unimproved Text       
13 One row for each 
mitigation, 200 LSA 
features, drop rows not in 
top 100 
134 
49 
268 
593 
66 
0.86 
0.95 
1.00 
0.73 
0.50 
(0.81) 
0.75 
0.76 
0.90 
0.69 
0.33 
(0.69) 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.11 
0.06 
(0.04) 
6 
19 
18 
22 
5 
(64%) 
2 
6 
3 
14 
15 
(36%) 
14 Ensemble classifier based 
on (Gee, 2003) 
134 
49 
268 
593 
66 
0.00 
0.63 
0.66 
0.30 
0.00 
(0.32) 
0.00 
0.83 
0.50 
0.75 
0.00 
(0.42) 
0.00 
0.03 
0.02 
0.04 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0 
5 
2 
3 
0 
(53%) 
1 
1 
2 
1 
4 
(47%) 
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# Trial 
 
Threat P  
(Mean) 
R 
(Mean) 
FP 
(Mean) 
#C #I 
 Improved Text       
18
d 
One row for each 
mitigation, 200 LSA 
features, drop rows not in 
top 100 
134 
49 
268 
593 
66 
1.00 
0.96 
0.95 
0.94 
0.86 
(0.94) 
0.88 
0.92 
0.95 
0.86 
0.90 
(0.90) 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.03 
0.04 
(0.02) 
7 
23 
20 
30 
18 
(89%) 
1 
2 
1 
6 
2 
(11%) 
19 Ensemble classifier based 
on (Gee, 2003) 
134 
49 
268 
593 
66 
1.00 
0.75 
0.80 
0.45 
0.80 
(0.76) 
0.50 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
(0.90) 
0.00 
0.01 
0.02 
0.03 
0.01 
(0.01) 
1 
6 
4 
5 
4 
(95%) 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
(5%) 
 “One for All” - Beyond the Per Threat Approach 
So far, we have discussed matching approaches that are implemented on a “per threat” basis. 
This approach is derived from the medical SRs research discussed in the Literature Review. It 
is based on the premise that each threat has its own pattern or semantics. A “per threat” solution 
is not unreasonable and would work for our purposes as described in the Architecture section. 
However, we wondered if there was a way to implement a “one for all” approach where a single 
matcher would determine relevant mitigations for any threat contained in the corpus. In the next 
paragraphs, we discuss two trials towards a “one for all” approach as summarized in Table D-
14. We used the unimproved text for these trials because it was not practical to improve the text 
of the entire CAPEC dataset. 
Table D-14. “One for All” Trials 
# Trial Class P R FP F C I 
20 All threat-mitigation 
combinations, up to 200 LSA 
features of each, unimproved text, 
Weka SMO 
R 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 593 
NR 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 86915 0 
         
21 Ensemble classifier based on 
(Gee, 2003) 
R     3 8 
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Trial 20 
In Trial 20, we used LSA to create a semantic space representing all the standard threats 
and a separate semantic space representing all the labeled mitigations for these threats. Then 
for each combination of a threat and a mitigation, we made a training dataset consisting of the 
200 LSA factors representing the mitigation from the corresponding semantic space, the threat 
id, 163 LSA factors representing the threat from the corresponding semantic space, and a label 
indicating whether the mitigation was relevant or not relevant to the threat. (Although we 
specified 200 features when building both semantic spaces, the threat space yielded only 163 
features.) The dataset consisted of 364 attributes and 87,000 instances. We trained a SMO 
model which we hoped might be able to answer for given threat (T) and mitigation (M), is M 
relevant to T? The results shown in Table 14 indicate that this model will not be able to 
distinguish relevant T-M pairs from non-relevant ones. Intuitively, this result makes sense. It is 
simply a hodge-podge of features tagged either R or NR. When the threat features and the 
mitigation features are comingled, the model does not know which features represent the threat 
and which represent the mitigation. Also, there is no reason to expect that, for example, a 
relevant T-M pair for Threat 49 will have anything in common with a relevant T-M pair for 
Threat 268 to indicate that they are both of class R since they express totally different concepts.  
 
Trial 21 
In Trial 21, we constructed a model based on (Gee, 2003)6 to try to select the threat T 
to which a new mitigation M is relevant from among all threats in the corpus based on M’s 
similarity to  labeled mitigations already known to be relevant to T. We used LSA to create a 
semantic space of the mitigations mapped to all the standard threats in the corpus and we also 
created an index of which mitigations are labeled relevant to each threat. In this classifier threat 
id is the dependent variable. When a new mitigation document is presented, it is used as a query 
against the semantic space, returning a ranked list of other mitigation documents similar to the 
query from most similar to least. The trial 21 model classifies the new document in three stages. 
First, it is classified according to the class of its nearest neighbor in the space (i.e. it is assigned 
the threat id associated with the existing mitigation document whose similarity score is highest). 
                                                 
6
 Note this model is not the same as the one discussed in the “per threat” section, trials 14 and 19. 
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Next, the new mitigation document is classified according to the class (threat id) associated 
with of the majority of all mitigations in the ranked list truncated at an arbitrary cut-off N. 
Finally, if the majority and nearest neighbor stages agree, the new mitigation document is 
deemed to be relevant to the threat to which its nearest neighbor is relevant. If the majority and 
nearest neighbor stages do not agree, the dispute is settled by the third stage which attempts to 
detect the skew of the new document towards one class or the other. We implemented the first 
two stages (but not the tie-breaker) and tested the results with 11 representative mitigations. Of 
these, the model classified 3 mitigations as relevant to the correct threat, 7 to an incorrect threat, 
and 1 resulted in a tie, which we count as incorrect in the absence of tie-breaker logic. These 
results were so poor that we did not invest any time in developing a tie-breaker, since it would 
only come into play a small percentage of the time. This result was more of a brain teaser than 
the prior trial, but in the final analysis it also made intuitive sense. Given a threat, for example, 
breach of physical access, we may have mitigations that describe a fence, a wall, a moat, and 
drone surveillance and each of these mitigations will furthermore describe how they mitigate 
the threat. If we present a new mitigation, for example, an armed guard, which also describes 
how it mitigates the threat, the mitigation itself (armed guard) is not very similar to any of the 
other mitigations (fence, wall, moat, drone) for the threat. Even though all the listed mitigations 
may present as similar to the threat, the inverse is not necessarily true.  
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APPENDIX E: CYBER RISK ASSESSMENT 
A number of cyber risk assessment methodologies are described in the literature and in 
use today. These include: 
• Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, 
and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) (Caralli et al., 2007) 
• ISACA Risk IT Framework based on Control Objectives for Information and Related 
Technologies (COBIT) (ISACA, 2009; Schmittling, 2010) 
• Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory Mission Information Risk 
Analysis (MIRA) (Llanso et al., 2012) (Llanso et al., 2013) 
• Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory BluGen (Llanso et al., 2017) 
• Mitre Crown Jewels Analysis (CJA) and Threat Assessment and Remediation 
Methodology (TARA) (MITRE, 2015) 
• US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-30: 
Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2012) 
• Automated Risk and Utility Management (AURUM) (Fenz et al., 2011) 
These were selected because they are representative of approaches in use by 
organizations that employ formal cyber risk assessment processes and because descriptions are 
available in open literature. Note that this is not an exhaustive survey of such methodologies, 
and in particular does not include proprietary and other closed-source methodologies.  
OCTAVE is an eight-step process, as follows. First, impact areas (e.g. financial, 
productivity, reputation, health, etc.) are identified and ranked. Next critical information assets 
are identified as well as IT and non-IT locations where critical information is processed and 
stored. Then situations that could affect the critical information are enumerated and threat 
scenarios (including asset, actor, access, motive, and outcome) are identified. The consequences 
of identified threat scenarios are assessed to point out risks. An aggregate score is derived for 
each identified threat/consequence by assigning qualitative impact values (e.g. high, medium, 
low) to each identified threat/consequence for each impact area, multiplying by the rank of the 
impact area, and summing the products. Finally, a relative risk matrix is developed based on 
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probability of occurrence (high, medium, low) and score ranges, then mitigation approaches are 
selected based on the risk matrix.  
Similarly, Risk IT, advocates identifying risk scenarios derived from understanding of 
business objectives, where each scenario considers the potential actor (insider, competitor, etc.), 
threat type (malicious, accidental, etc.), event type, asset or resource affected, and time. 
Likewise, CJA+TARA considers mission priorities and potential impacts due to cyber, 
identifying the potential threats faced by each individual asset based on common attack patterns 
cataloged in CAPEC (MITRE, 2017a), scoring (on a scale of 1-5) each threat in multiple 
dimensions, and aggregating to produce a risk score per asset. Additionally, the NIST risk 
assessment process is a 5-step process, including: (1) identify possible threat sources and 
events, (2) identify inherent vulnerabilities and predisposing conditions present in the system, 
(3) determine likelihood of occurrence of events, (4) determine magnitude of impact of each 
event occurrence, and (5) determine risk as a combination of likelihood of occurrence and 
impact. The AURUM Framework follows the NIST risk assessment process and also includes 
automated control recommendations. 
In MIRA, two sets of risk scores are expert-generated. First, experts judge mission 
impact for each viable combination of mission, system asset, data type, and cyber effect 
(confidentiality, integrity, or availability). Also, expert input for adversary level of effort 
(LOE), the amount of effort and/or resources an adversary would have to apply to realize the 
effect, is required for each viable combination of asset, data type, cyber effect and attack vector. 
Risk is then visualized by plotting the mission contexts on an x-y plot such that those with the 
highest mission impact (x) and lowest LOE (y) are the highest priority candidates for mitigation. 
BluGen takes a capability-centric approach based on an expert-constructed reusable 
knowledge resource called the Reference Catalog. In this catalog, threats are mapped to asset 
types in a taxonomy and mitigations are mapped to threats. Consistent with event-centric 
approaches, like MIRA, OCTAVE, CJA, Risk IT, and AURUM, BluGen intakes a description 
of the system being assessed, including assets, data types, and mitigations already present. 
BluGen requires a set of raw criticality scores, one for each viable combination of mission, 
asset, data type, and cyber effect. BluGen estimates risk from these scores and the threat-asset 
type mappings. To the extent that threat-mitigation mappings exist in the Reference Catalog, 
BluGen is the only method discussed here that recommends mitigations; however, the catalog 
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is still in its infancy. Ongoing construction of the BluGen Reference Catalog could benefit from 
an automated approach to mapping mitigations to threats. Table E.1 summarizes the risk 
assessment methods discussed above. 
Table E.1. Asset-based, Threat-informed Cyber Risk Assessment Methods 
 
Method 
Characterize 
System 
Characterize 
Mission 
Characterize 
Threat 
Assess 
Risk 
AURUM 
(Fenz et al., 2011) 
Assets Magnitude of 
impact of 
adverse events 
Threat sources 
and events; 
inherent 
vulnerabilities; 
likelihood of 
occurrence 
Aggregation of 
combined 
likelihood of 
occurrence and 
impact  
BluGen 
(Llanso et al., 
2017) 
Assets, data, 
existing 
mitigations 
Mission 
weights, 
criticality 
scores per 
mission/asset/ 
data/cyber 
effect 
Adversary’s 
anticipated 
offensive 
capabilities  
Asset exposure 
based on existing 
mitigations and 
Reference Catalog 
mappings, asset 
criticality based 
on aggregation of 
individual 
criticality scores 
CJA+TARA 
(MITRE, 2015) 
 
Assets Mission 
priorities 
Potential 
threats by 
asset, scored 
based on 
common 
attack patterns 
Aggregation of 
scores 
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Method 
Characterize 
System 
Characterize 
Mission 
Characterize 
Threat 
Assess 
Risk 
MIRA 
(Llanso et al., 
2012, 2013) 
Assets, data, 
connectivity 
Mission impact 
per asset/data/ 
cyber effect 
Adverse 
events scored 
by required 
adversary LOE 
per asset/data/ 
cyber 
effect/attack 
vector 
x-y plot of assets 
by mission impact 
and LOE 
NIST SP 800-30 
(National Institute 
of Standards and 
Technology, 
2012) 
Assets Magnitude of 
impact of 
adverse events 
Threat sources 
and events; 
inherent 
vulnerabilities; 
likelihood of 
occurrence 
Aggregation of 
combined 
likelihood of 
occurrence and 
impact  
OCTAVE 
(Caralli et al., 
2007) 
Assets, 
locations, 
information 
Areas of 
impact, 
consequences 
Threat 
scenarios 
(asset, actor, 
access, motive, 
and outcome) 
Aggregation of 
scores for each 
identified threat/ 
consequence  
RISKIT 
(ISACA, 2009; 
Schmittling, 
2010) 
Assets Business 
objectives 
Threat 
scenarios 
(asset, actor, 
motive, time), 
frequency and 
magnitude of 
impact of 
occurrences 
Aggregation of 
magnitude of 
impact 
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APPENDIX F: MITIGATION OPTIMIZATION APPROACHES 
The CSE faces two main problems when selecting a security control portfolio to address 
an organization’s cyber risk. First, there may be multiple conflicting objectives to be considered 
(e.g. cost, ease of use) making it impossible to arrive at a single optimal solution. At the same 
time, the number of combinations of viable alternatives presents an overwhelmingly large 
search space, requiring strategies to winnow it down to a tractable scope. These decisions are 
complex and inexact, involve multiple stakeholders with diverse interests, and require trade-
offs between conflicting objectives. Moreover, information environments, risk tolerance levels, 
and the threats they face vary widely from one organization to the next. (Kiesling et al., 2016) 
Hence, compromise solutions must be sought. There is a large body of research which applies 
multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) techniques to solve the mitigation optimization 
problem. In addition, a few authors have applied game theory to the problem. We discuss these 
below and summarize them in Table F-1. 
Multi-Criteria Decision-Making Approaches 
Multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM), also known as multiple-criteria decision 
analysis (MCDA), is widely applied to security portfolio selection (Fenz et al., 2011; Llansó et 
al., 2019; Patterson et al., 2013; Sawik, 2013; Schilling & Werners, 2016; Weishäupl, 2017; 
Yevseyeva et al., 2015). MCDM is discipline for evaluating multiple conflicting criteria. It is 
used to analyze problems where these are some measures of costs and benefits which can be 
traded off to arrive at the best solution under the given constraints. Researchers investigate a 
number of MCDM techniques for this problem, some of which include or are based on fuzzy 
set theory (Otero, 2014), multi-attribute utility theory (i.e. value functions, knapsack strategy) 
(Fielder et al., 2016; Panaousis et al., 2014; Shapasand et al., 2015; Smeraldi & Malacaria, 
2014), evolutionary multi-objective optimization (EMO) also known as genetic algorithms 
(Gupta et al., 2006; Kiesling et al., 2016, 2012; Rees et al., 2011; Sarala et al., 2016; Viduto et 
al., 2012), analytic hierarchy process (AHP) (El-Gayar & Fritz, 2010), grey relational analysis 
(GRA) (Breier & Hudec, 2013), simple additive weighting (SAW) (Llanso, 2012; Llansó et al., 
2019), the technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) (Breier & 
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Hudec, 2013), and preference ranking organization method for enrichment evaluation 
(PROMETHEE) (Lv et al., 2011). 
(Fenz et al., 2011) describe an automated approach to mitigation selection that requires 
as input an enumeration of relevant potential controls, risk level of the protected asset, and 
control attributes, such as cost and effectiveness. Their method defines mitigation selection in 
terms of a multi-objective combinatorial optimization problem which seeks to select controls 
by analyzing alternatives in consideration of the stakeholder’s objectives, such as risk reduction, 
cost, availability, and reliability to choose Pareto-efficient combinations. They provide a user 
interface where each objective is represented by a slider, allowing the stakeholder to tune the 
upper and lower bounds of his objectives and obtain immediate feedback. 
(Patterson et al., 2013) describe a method for optimizing security control decisions for 
critical infrastructure systems. Given a fixed budget, the method balances costs and benefits of 
improving three dimensions of cybersecurity, intrusion prevention, detection, and response by 
posing the selection as an optimization problem. The goal of the optimization is to select the 
investment strategy that yields the smallest residual probability of successful attack, i.e. the best 
security portfolio for the budget. This optimization problem requires models of the system 
under analysis, cost and performance of applicable security controls, and risk. The authors note 
that creating the models presents a large challenge for future work. 
Given an enumeration of threats and potential mitigations, (Sawik, 2013) describes a bi-
objective mixed integer trade-off model to select an optimal countermeasure portfolio  
balancing expected and worst-case losses. The model applies conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) 
and scenario-based analysis to select controls by considering desired confidence, expected loss, 
budget, and risk tolerance. 
(Schilling & Werners, 2016) present a combinatorial optimization model for optimal 
selection of security controls. Unlike most models, which are based on cost minimization, this 
model minimizes the number of controls as a proxy for cost. The authors decided to do this 
because it eliminates the need to collect cost data on all the candidate solutions before selecting 
a solution. Their idea is to cost out the selected solution and if the cost is too high, rerun the 
model after reducing the number of controls. 
(Weishäupl, 2017) describe a multi-objective optimization model for control selection 
which seeks to minimize control cost while maximizing security level. Overall security level is 
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computed as the sum of the security levels of individual assets weighted by importance. Each 
asset’s security level is inversely proportional to the severities of the vulnerabilities by which 
it is affected accounting for probability of occurrence. Cost is the sum of initial costs (e.g. 
purchase, set-up), operating costs (e.g. annual fees and ongoing maintenance), and costs 
associated with security breaches (e.g. disruption of business, damage, reputation, decline in 
stock price). 
(Yevseyeva et al., 2015) present two formulations of security control selection based on 
quadratic integer programming based on a traditional risk vs return model common in financial 
portfolio selection. A multi-objective formula seeks to minimize risk (based on probability of 
successful attack) and maximize return (by minimizing expected losses due to cyber breach) 
while simultaneously satisfying a budget constraint. A single-objective formula is derived from 
the multi-objective formula by assuming that both the return and the budget are constrained. 
(Yevseyeva, Fernandes, Van Moorsel, Janicke, & Emmerich, 2016) seek to apply the 
Sharpe ratio common in financial analysis to security control selection based on a fixed budget 
and two objectives, risk and return. Maximizing the Sharpe ratio supports computation of 
efficient portfolios while balancing the objectives in an optimal way. 
In his doctoral dissertation, (Otero, 2014) describes creation of an artifact based on 
fuzzy set theory and constructed using the MATLAB Fuzzy Logic Toolbox. Taking four input 
variables for each security control under consideration - estimated implementation cost, scope 
(number of assets protected), extent of compliance with laws and regulations, and effectiveness 
in addressing the risks - Otero’s artifact includes fuzzy “if-then” rules and membership 
functions defining objectives and constraints developed in consultation with cybersecurity 
experts and based on the literature. Execution of the rules results in a set of selected controls. 
The design of the rules and functions in the artifact is based on expert responses to a survey that 
asks experts to identify the existing controls in place in their organization, rank the 11 ISO/IEC 
2702 information security areas by order of importance to the organization, rate the detailed list 
of security controls in their top three security areas on cost, scope, compliance, and 
effectiveness. 
(Panaousis et al., 2014) model the cybersecurity posture of an organization and then 
present a series of non-cooperative control-games where each game is between the defender (a 
single control) and the attacker. The Nash Equilibria of the games is derived in consideration 
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of organizational preferences such as costs, anticipated threats, and asset importance. A multi-
objective, multi-choice knapsack approach is then used to optimize investment in controls 
within the organization’s budget. 
(Shapasand et al., 2015) apply a knapsack model for control selection with budget as 
the constraint. Consts considered in this model include cost of maintaining desired levels of 
C/I/A, profit reduction due to C/I/A compromise, and penalty cost (e.g. fines, reputation) due 
to C/I/A compromise. (Smeraldi & Malacaria, 2014) describe a combinatoric optimization 
algorithm based on variations of the knapsack problem that can also account for mitigations 
that benefit more than one asset and mitigations that, when applied together, provide more 
benefit than the sum of their individual benefits. 
(Kiesling et al., 2012) describe a decision support framework for security control 
selection consisting of three stages. In the modeling stage assets, threats, and available controls 
are identified. In the second stage, a baseline risk assessment is determined through simulation. 
Finally, Pareto-efficient control portfolios are computed via multi-objective optimization. 
(Kiesling et al., 2016) describe Multi-Objective decision Support in Efficient Security 
Safeguard Selection (MOSES3), a collaborative decision support process that enables 
cybersecurity professionals and strategic decision makers to “bridge the gap between strategic 
security investment and operational implementation decisions.” After describing the system 
architecture (assets, data, access), identifying threats and attacker skill level, and enumerating 
existing controls, assets are valued according to their criticality by C/I/A and candidate 
mitigations per asset and are specified. An attack-based simulation seeks to estimate a set of 
Pareto-efficient security control portfolios, optimizing via a genetic algorithm while 
minimizing the specified objectives (cost, C/I/A impact, undetected rate, target reached rate). 
Each portfolio is evaluated by initializing the system model with the given set of controls then 
simulating attacks and aggregating attack outcomes. 
(Gupta et al., 2006) present a genetic algorithm approach for selecting a security profile 
that minimizes cost while also minimizing the number of unmitigated vulnerabilities. (Rees et 
al., 2011) present a decision support system which uses a genetic algorithm to determine an 
optimal combination of countermeasures by trading off cost versus residual risk where risk is 
calculated as the sum for all anticipated threats of the number of occurrences expected annually 
and the expected cost of each occurrence. 
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(Sarala et al., 2016) describe an approach to optimizing control selection where 
solutions must observe a budgetary constraint and solution cost must not exceed the anticipated 
losses if threats were left unmitigated. Their approach solves a multi-objective problem by 
applying TABU search combined with genetic algorithm. The objectives, to maximize the 
number of vulnerabilities addressed while minimizing the cost of the solution, are first 
processed via the TABU search to arrive at a set of Pareto-efficient solutions. These serve as 
the initial input to a genetic algorithm  
(Viduto et al., 2012) apply the evolutionary algorithm known as Multi-Objective Tabu 
Search (MOTS) for selecting security controls as a multi-objective optimization problem 
balancing financial costs (purchase, operational, training, and labor) and residual risk. The 
MOTS algorithm was shown to arrive at a Pareto-efficient set more rapidly than the exhaustive 
search method with similar quality solutions. 
(El-Gayar & Fritz, 2010) describe a collaborative multi-perspective decision support 
system (DSS) based on AHP and stakeholder input. The decision model is comprised of assets, 
threats, and controls expressed as a set of vectors and analysis subspaces representing the 
pairwise interactions, e.g. threat-asset, threat-control, and asset-control. Stakeholders may be 
assigned unequal weights. They express judgments of the pairwise interactions. Judgments are 
aggregated using the weighted arithmetic mean to provide a ranked list in order of importance. 
(Breier & Hudec, 2013) describe a quantitative prioritization of security controls based 
on asset valuation and the threats identified by an a priori risk assessment. Their method uses 
GRA combined with the TOPSIS, taking as inputs asset importance (financial values), threat 
data (impact, to which assets, probability of occurrence), and potential security controls 
(purchase price, difficulty of implementation, maintenance cost, efficiency, applicable to which 
threats). The security control alternatives are evaluated based on cost, efficiency, and protection 
against the most significant threats and the top n are selected. 
Cyber Investment Analysis Methodology (CIAM) (Llanso, 2012) combines data about 
the infrastructure to be protected (key hardware, software, people, and processes), incident data 
(vulnerabilities, attack steps, and frequency) related to the infrastructure, potential security 
controls including cost to install and maintain, possible business impacts of cyber events, and 
control weightings (effectiveness) to compute an initial selection of security controls and 
investment prioritization. A SAW algorithm combines the incident data, effectiveness scores, 
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control costs, and impact data to compute a list of controls in relative priority order. The list 
can be used to select controls in the content to an overall cyber security budget. 
(Lv et al., 2011) describe a multi-criteria ranking model based on PROMETHEE 
method. Its accepts a finite set of security controls and a set of evaluation criteria (e.g. purchase 
cost, operating/maintenance cost, effectiveness, alignment with standards) as inputs, then ranks 
security controls quantitatively. Evaluation criteria must be numeric, but they can have various 
units and some may be minimized while others are maximized in order to identify a set of 
controls that optimizes all the criteria. 
(Llansó et al., 2019) describe a SAW-based mitigation selection approach that uses a 
set of weighted criteria and a a capability-based representation for cybersecurity mitigations. 
The security engineer sets the weights based on organizational priorities and constraints and the 
algorithm recommends a candidate set of mitigations representing a “practical middle ground 
between completely ad hoc mitigation selection approaches” and “approaches whose 
computational complexity requires the use of sophisticated heuristic algorithms.” 
Game Theoretic Approaches 
Several authors apply game theory to security portfolio selection in combination with 
MCDM techniques. (Fielder et al., 2016) employs a pure game theoretic approach in a single 
massive two-person non-cooperative zero-sum static game where the defender (person in 
charge of choosing controls) competes against an attacker who chooses among various attack 
targets. The Nash equilibrium of the game represents the best control portfolio. Recognizing 
that the organization may not have sufficient budget to implement the equilibrium of the pure 
game, they also discuss a hybrid approach combining game theory with a knapsack strategy. 
(Panaousis et al., 2014) model the cybersecurity posture of an organization and then present a 
series of non-cooperative control-games where each game is between the defender (a single 
control) and the attacker. The Nash equilibria of the games are derived in consideration of 
organizational preferences such as costs, anticipated threats, and asset importance. A knapsack 
approach is subsequently used to optimize investment in security controls within the 
organization’s budget. Finally, (Wang & Zhu, 2016) used evolutionary game theory to 
investigate long-term cybersecurity investment strategy finding that firms will invest as long as 
either the cost to invest is low or the cost of a breach is high. 
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Table F.1. Selected Mitigation Optimization Approaches 
 
Method Inputs Analysis Approach 
(Barnard & von Solms, 
2000) 
Business analysis 
Security requirements / policy 
Potential security controls 
Evaluation criteria  
Flow-based control 
selection model 
(Breier & Hudec, 2013) Asset financial values 
Threats to assets 
Potential countermeasures 
Countermeasure cost, efficiency 
GRA combined with 
TOPSIS 
(El-Gayar & Fritz, 2010) Assets 
Threats 
Controls 
Weighted stakeholder judgments 
Analytic hierarch process 
(Fielder et al., 2016) Threats 
Controls 
Degrees of control implementation 
Game theory: two-person 
non-cooperative zero-sum 
static game combined 
with MCDM knapsack 
strategy 
(Fenz et al., 2011) Potential controls 
Risk level of the protected asset 
Control attributes such as cost and 
effectiveness 
MCDM multi-objective 
combinatorial 
optimization (Pareto 
efficiency) 
(Gupta et al., 2006) Controls 
Cost 
Unmitigated vulnerabilities 
Evolutionary multi-
objective optimization / 
genetic algorithms 
(Kiesling et al., 2012) 
 
Assets 
Threats  
Controls 
MCDM: Pareto efficiency 
110 
Method Inputs Analysis Approach 
(Kiesling et al., 2016) System architecture (assets, data, 
access) 
Threats and attacker skill level 
Existing controls 
Assets valued according to their 
criticality by C/I/A 
Candidate mitigations per asset  
Evolutionary multi-
objective optimization / 
genetic algorithms 
(Llanso, 2012) 
Cyber Investment 
Analysis Methodology 
(CIAM) 
 
Assets to be protected 
Incident data related to the assets 
Potential security controls 
Installation and maintenance cost 
Control effectiveness 
Possible business impacts of cyber 
events 
Simple additive 
weighting: cost/benefit 
algorithm 
(Lv et al., 2011) Potential security controls 
Evaluation criteria (cost, 
effectiveness, organizational 
priorities) 
Multi-criteria ranking, 
PROMETHEE 
(MITRE, 2017c) 
Cyber Risk Remediation 
Analysis (RRA) 
 
Table of countermeasures per 
threat 
Cost of countermeasures 
High to low ranking by 
cost 
(Otero, 2014) Potential security controls 
(implementation cost, scope, extent 
of compliance, effectiveness) 
MCDM: Fuzzy logic / 
fuzzy set theory 
(Panaousis et al., 2014) Potential controls 
Organizational preferences such as 
costs, anticipated threats, and asset 
importance 
Game theory non-
cooperative control-games 
combined with MCDM 
multi-attribute utility 
theory 
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Method Inputs Analysis Approach 
(Patterson et al., 2013) Model of the system under analysis 
Applicable security controls  
Control cost and performance 
Risk 
Budget 
MCDM 
(Rees et al., 2011) Potential controls 
Control cost 
Residual risk after control 
Anticipated threats and annual rate 
of occurrence 
Evolutionary multi-
objective optimization / 
genetic algorithms 
(Sarala et al., 2016) Potential controls 
Budgetary constraint (maximum 
acceptable control portfolio cost) 
Anticipated financial loss if threats 
left unmitigated 
Vulnerabilities 
Evolutionary multi-
objective optimization / 
genetic algorithms 
(Sawik, 2013) Threats 
Potential mitigations 
Expected loss 
Budget 
Risk tolerance 
Potential mitigations 
MCDM: bi-objective 
trade-off model 
(Schilling & Werners, 
2016) 
Potential controls 
Number of controls as a proxy for 
cost 
MCDM: combinatorial 
optimization 
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Method Inputs Analysis Approach 
(Shapasand et al., 2015) Potential controls  
Cost of maintaining desired levels of 
C/I/A,  
Profit reduction due to C/I/A 
compromise 
Penalty cost (e.g. fines, reputation) 
due to C/I/A compromise 
MCDM: multi-attribute 
utility theory, knapsack 
model 
(Smeraldi & Malacaria, 
2014) 
Mitigations 
Applicability to multiple assets 
MCDM: multi-attribute 
utility theory, knapsack 
model 
(Viduto et al., 2012) Potential mitigations 
Financial costs (purchase, 
operational, training, and labor)  
Residual risk 
Evolutionary multi-
objective optimization / 
genetic algorithms 
(Wang & Zhu, 2016) Potential controls 
Control cost 
Anticipated losses due to 
unmitigated cyber breach (including 
reputation) 
Evolutionary game theory 
(Weishäupl, 2017) Potential controls 
Control costs 
Security level provided by controls 
Asset importance 
Vulnerability severity per asset 
MCDM: multi-objective 
optimization 
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Method Inputs Analysis Approach 
(Yevseyeva et al., 2015) Potential controls 
Risk (probability of successful 
attack) 
Anticipated losses due to cyber 
breach 
Control effectiveness in reducing 
loss 
Budget constraint 
MCDM: quadratic integer 
programming 
(Yevseyeva et al., 2016) Potential controls 
Risk  
Return (anticipated loss minus 
control effectiveness) 
Budget constraint 
Sharpe ratio 
 
 
